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I. INTRODUCTION

The economic gap between affluent suburbia and the central city has
recently received widespread attention in the state and local government
law literature. Articles by prominent scholars representing a broad range
of doctrinal approaches have coalesced around a consensus that the current
concentration of wealth and resources in metropolitan areas is
unacceptable, and that the allocation of local government powers has
helped to preserve, and indeed enhance, the schism between the "favored
quarter"' and the inner urban core. Though the underlying normative
arguments rest on very different rationales, their common goal of reducing
regional disparities has made the scholarly dialogue a dispute over how,
rather than whether, to stimulate a more equitable distribution of wealth,
services, and opportunities in major metropolitan regions?
For some, like Professor Clayton Gillette, reformists of local
government structure should tinker as little as possible with the existing
system, in which municipal governments exercise substantial autonomy,
and fragmented and overlapping single purpose government units continue
to increase at a rapid pace. 3 Others, like Professors Gerald Frug and
Richard Thompson Ford, similarly champion the preservation of local
power, but support radical reformulation of the ways local governments
currently exercise that power.' Still others, like Professors Richard
Briffault and Sheryll Cashin, have argued strenuously for the creation of

1. Myron Orfield, a Minnesota state legislator, used the term "favored quarter" to refer to
the small segment of metropolitan areas with wealthy, high tax-base suburbs. MYRON ORFIELD,
METRopouics: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNrIY AND STABirY 5 (1997). According to
Orfield, all major metropolitan regions display a remarkably similar distribution of population and
wealth: "20-40 percent of the people live in central cities, 25-30 percent in older declining suburbs,
and 10-15 percent in low tax-base suburbs." Myron Orfield, Conflict or Consensus? Forty Years
of Minnesota MetropolitanPolitics,BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1998, at 34. The remainder comprises
the favored quarter. Id. at 31. Orfield seeks to promote natural political alliances between central
city and older suburbs, many of which face similar problems with aging infrastructure, high social
service needs, increasing poverty, and declining tax bases. ORFIELD, METROPOUCS, supra,at 13.
He recommends joint legislative efforts to seek the imposition of regional fair housing obligations,
property tax sharing, and a redirection of government infrastructure spending from urban fringes
to the central city and inner suburban ring. Id. at 114-21.
2. See Laurie Reynolds, IntergovernmentalCooperation,MetropolitanEquity, andtheNew
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93, 110-19 (2003), for a discussion of the growing coalescence
among local government law scholars.
3. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and InterlocalBargains,76 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 190 (2001).
4. See Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders:A PartialResponse to RichardBriffault,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1188-95 (1996); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1841, 1913-15 (1994); Jerry Frug,
DecenteringDecentralization,60 U. Cm. L. REV. 253, 273-338 (1993).
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a general purpose elected regional unit of government, which would
assume control over region-wide issues and work with existing local
government units to accomplish a more equitable distribution of resources
in metropolitan areas.' Though their proposals diverge, the work of all of
these scholars focuses on ways the current legal system has made it
possible for affluent suburbs to capture wealth and impose costs on other
parts of metropolitan areas, most importantly through the exercise of
zoning powers, taxation powers, and school funding systems.
In general, current regionalist scholarship highlights inter-municipal
disparities and evaluates proposals for redistribution through the lens of the
existing rules of local government formation. The commentators recognize,
for instance, that the state statutory procedures for local government
incorporation and annexation provide a strong incentive for affluent groups
to form a local government whose residents have roughly equal amounts
of wealth and, just as important, substantially similar service needs and
desires.' By taking advantage of the autonomy and power offered to
municipal governments under the laws of most states, and the protection
against annexation it provides,7 affluent, homogeneous enclaves are able
to capture the wealth within their borders and tax it only to serve the needs
of their similarly situated neighbors.' In the resulting financial picture,
residents view their local government as a vehicle for providing services
that everyone in the community desires, creating what Professor Frug has
called the "consumer-oriented vision" of local government.9 Moreover, if
taxes are used to provide the same services for taxpayers of similar wealth
and service needs, they lose their redistributive impact and become, again
in Professor Frug's words, more like country club dues."
In Frug's view, the negative consequences of the consumer approach
to local government are threefold. First, it "replac[es] the one-person, onevote principle associated with democracy with the one-dollar, one-vote rule
5. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government BoundaryProblem in MetropolitanAreas,
48 STAN. L. REv. 115, 1164-71 (1996); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the
Tyranny of the FavoredQuarter:Addressingthe Barriersto New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985,
2034-47 (2000).
6. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: PartI-The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 73-85 (1990); Cashin, supra note 5, at 1991-95; Jerry Frug, The Geography
of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1071 (1996); Gillette, supranote 3, at 190-92.
7. See Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247
(1992), for an analysis and critique of state statutory procedures that restrict municipal annexation
power.
8. See sources cited supra note 6.
9. Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv.23, 30-31 (1998).
10. Id. at 29-30. Professor Lee Anne Fennell describes work in "club theory" that makes the
same analogy. See Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 625 & n.33 (2002)
(reviewing WILLAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HoME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (200 1)).
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of the marketplace."" Second, he argues, it "perpetuates a pervasive, but
false, justification for the radical differences that now exist between the
quality of city services available in different parts of America's
metropolitan regions."' 2 Finally, and most fundamentally, it trivializes and
denigrates the "values commonly associated with democracy-notions of
equality, of the importance of collective deliberation and compromise,
[and] of the existence of a public interest not reducible to .personal
,"13
economic concerns ....
This Article looks at the consumer view of local government from an
intra- rather than inter-municipal vantage point. Focusing on revenue
raising powers, this Article explores how the "dues mentality"' 4 pervades
many aspects of local governments' never-ending quest to raise more
money. In particular, this Article evaluates how special assessments, fees,
and the formation of business improvement districts have overtaken
general taxation as the preeminent revenue raising device. As later Parts
will show, the use of these techniques further exacerbates and cements the
dues mentality in the minds of the citizenry, as taxpayers become
accustomed to finely tuned tax-like charges that are levied in exchange for
a growing number of government services. Though local government
incentives to resort to these devices may have nothing to do with
regionalism, the result is anti-regional nonetheless. 5 Citizens who are
repeatedly asked to pay a specific charge or assessment for a new
government service are likely to develop the mindset that they are paying
for what they get. In turn, this "get what you pay for" mentality may
produce widespread opposition to the use of general tax dollars for

11. Frug, supra note 9, at 31.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 32. In a recent monograph, Professor Lizabeth Cohen traces the development of
what she dubs the "'consumerization of the republic."' LiZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS'
REPutiLc: THE PoLnCs OF MASS CONSUMPTIONIN POSTwARAMERiCA 344 (2003). Beginning with
the Depression and continuing up through the present, Professor Cohen shows how mass
consumption radically altered the economy, national politics, and our culture. See id.Most
fundamentally for this Article, Professor Cohen describes how the use of sophisticated advertising
techniques converted national elections from a debate over the general public welfare to an appeal
to the narrow self-interest of numerous demographic and racial groups. Id. at 331-44. And because
campaigns now appeal to voter self-interest, she argues, it is logical to expect that voters bring those
market expectations to their analysis of government, judging it by the personal benefits they derive
from any particular policy or proposed legislation. See id. at 293-344. The "market expectations"
Professor Cohen describes, id. at 344, are the "dues mentality" I use in this Article.
14. Several of my students have described this phenomenon more colorfully as the "pay for
play" approach to local government law. Either term accurately describes the thesis explored in this
Article.
15. See Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance,82 MINN.
L. REV. 503 (1997), for a discussion of incentives that lead local governments to create a range of
sub-local units.
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redistributive purposes and, more fundamentally, taxation efforts in
general. 16
These observations have serious implications for the future of
regionalism reforms. If, in fact, the dues mentality is firmly ingrained at the
local and sub-local level, it is not immediately apparent that current
regionalist proposals would do much to alter the metropolitan landscape.
That is, even a general purpose regional government, if it continues to
operate with familiar devices like assessments, fees, and special districts,
might preserve the same regional inequality as the more narrowly banded
local government predecessor; only the level at which the inequality is
produced will change.' 7 Thus, this Article concludes, regionalism's call for
reformulation of the existing legal rules needs to extend more broadly to
include reassessment of revenue raising techniques at the municipal level;
otherwise, not even major regional reforms will move us toward the
regionalists' goal of more equitable resource distribution across the
metropolitan area.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE RAISING POWERS
To provide the many local services that most U.S. residents depend on
and have come to expect, local governments raise billions of dollars
annually.'" In fact, notwithstanding frequent and repeated arguments about
ever greater limitations on local revenue raising powers, the amount of
locally raised revenue has increased steadily and continually over the past
five decades. 9 Accompanying this significant rise in local own-source
16. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 146.
17. In a recent article, Professor Clayton Gillette articulated a similar argument to justify his
opposition to consolidated, general purpose regional legislatures: "If we simply reassemble selfinterested residents within common boundaries, we risk displacing interlocal conflicts with conflicts
among residents of equally artificial neighborhood boundaries within a larger metropolis." Gillette,
supra note 3, at 203. Some evidence, however, suggests that more highly regionalized entities do
engage in more redistribution. See Cashin, supra note 5, at 2034-35 (discussing the distribution of
public resources and regional burdens brought about by the adoption of regionwide tax sharing in
the Minneapolis metropolitan area).
18. In 1997, local governments (including counties, municipalities, townships, special
districts, and school districts) raised over $460 billion in own-source revenues. 4 U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: COMPENDIUM OF
GOVERNMENT FINANCES tbl.2 (2000) [hereinafter 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES]. That
figure excludes money received from intergovernmental transfers, principally from state and federal
government sources. Id.
19. In 1957, local government own-source revenue totaled almost $18 billion. 4 U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: COMPENDIUM OF
GOVERNMENT FINANCES tbl.6 (1959) [hereinafter 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES]. By
1967, the figure had more than doubled, to $38 billion. 4 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1967 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: COMPENDIUM OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES tbl.3
(1969). By 1977, the amount had again more than doubled, totaling $102 billion. 4 U.S. CENSUS

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

funds is a similarly rapid increase in the number of local government units
with revenue raising powers. 20 As a result, and not surprisingly, the range
and extent of local government powers to raise money for the provision of
services and infrastructure are almost dizzying in their complexity, their
variety, and in their sheer volume.
When a local government decides to provide a service, improve or
construct infrastructure, or regulate private activity, the question of how to
pay will generally be an important consideration. In simple terms, the first,
most fundamental decision the government must make is whether to resort
to taxation powers or to use a more narrowly targeted revenue device. For
purposes of simplicity, I designate this latter option "dues." This Part first
explores the basic differences between taxes and dues; it then describes the
numerous factors that influence the local government's 2' choice of one
approach over the other; and it concludes with an evaluation of the many
dues techniques that are currently prevalent in local government finance.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: COMPENDIUM OF
GOVERNMENT FINANCES tbl. 1 (1979) [hereinafter 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES]. The
BUREAU, U.S.

subsequent decade, to 1987, saw another doubling as the total reached $255 billion. 4 U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS: COMPENDIUM OF
GOVERNMENT FINANCES tbl.2 (1990). The most recent overall figures of $460 billion, for the first
time since 1957, show an increase that is less than double the previous decade's total. 1997 CENSUS
OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES, supra note 18, tbl.2.
20. Although the number of general purpose local governments, like cities and villages, has
remained relatively constant, special or single purpose local government units have increased
dramatically. Between 1952 and 1997, the number of special district governments nearly tripled,
rising from 12,340 to 34,683. 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1997 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS: GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION tbl.5 (1999). Over that same time period, sub-county
general purpose local governments increased from 34,009 to 36,001. Id. tbl.4. In comparison to
other units of local government, the proportion of spending by special districts has increased two
to three times more quickly. See KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLrICAL ECONOMY OF SPECIALPURPOSE GOVERNMENT 3 (1997).
21. The term "local government" refers to a wide number of government entities, ranging
from general purpose municipalities to single purpose special districts and public authorities. This
Article's assessment of local government revenue raising is applicable to all of those entities.
Although the breadth of special districts' revenue raising power is generally more limited, their
choice between dues and taxes will have the same impact on the increasing dues mentality in local
finance. In many instances, however, the analysis of special districts will be more complicated
because the explosive growth in special districts is itself evidence of the increasing dues mentality
in state and local government finance. Because of the district's narrowly drawn and extremely
limited powers, any revenue raising, whether accomplished through dues or taxation, will
necessarily be tied to that limited mandate. Thus, in a sense, the mere existence ofnumerous special
districts enhances the consumer mentality in local government. Each of these units acts to further
its own narrow purpose and then extracts payments from citizens to accomplish that purpose,
establishing a quid pro quo in exchange for the service provided. In some ways, then, even those
special districts that exercise taxation powers may contribute to the enhancement of the dues
mentality in local government.
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A. Dues vs. Taxes: What's the Difference?
Local taxes, like taxes levied at the state and federal level, are general
charges to raise revenue for the operational costs of government; they are
assessed against all who are within the scope of the government's taxing
authority.22 Though they differ widely with regard to the way in which the
tax rate is set and the extent to which a particular tax may be regressive or
progressive," taxes are levied without consideration of whether the
individual taxpayer will benefit from the services to be funded by the tax.24
Thus, taxes collectivize the cost of service and spread it across the
taxpaying population, either at a flat rate or prorated on the basis of ability
to pay or other indicia of wealth.25 Moreover, according to urban
economists, taxation promotes communal responsibility for the provision
of government services26 and ensures that services compete against each
other in the local political process for a share of the general tax revenue
pie.27 At the local level, the predominant form of taxation is the property
tax, which is levied as a percentage rate against the assessed value of each

22. For an extensive discussion of the many legal aspects of state and local taxation, see, for
example, 4 C. DALLAS SANDS ET AL., LOCAL GOvERNmENT LAW ch. 23 (Supp. 1996); and 16
EUGENEMcQuILLIN, LAWOFMUNICIPALCORPORATIONS §§ 44.01-44.198 (3d ed., rev. vol. 1994).
23. In general terms, the distinction between progressivity and regressivity in taxation is
straightforward: "A progressive revenue source requires poor households to pay a smaller share of
their income than rich households, while a regressive revenue source asks the poor to pay a larger
portion oftheir income than the rich." ALANA. ALTsHULER&JOStA. GOMEZ-IBAREZ, REGULATION
FORREVENUE 107 (1993). At the local level, the main source of taxation revenue is the property tax.
See id.Because the percentage of income spent on housing decreases as income increases, the
property tax is somewhat regressive. Id. at 135; see also WILLIAM G. COLMAN, NAT'L ACAD. OF
PUB. ADMIN., A QUIET REVOLUTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE: POuCY AND
ADMNISTRATIVE CHALLENGES INEXPANDING THE ROLE OF USER CHARGES INFINANCING STATE
ANDLOCALGOVERNMENT 13 (1983). Sales taxes are also regressive, because consumption expenses
constitute a higher percentage of total lower incomes. See ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBk&EZ, supra,
at 106.
24. The Supreme Court of Missouri offered the following definition: "Taxes are 'proportional
contributions imposed by the state upon individuals for the support of government and for all public
needs.' Taxes are not payments for a special privilege or a special service rendered." Leggett v. Mo.
State Life Ins. Co., 342 S.W.2d 833, 875 (Mo. 1961) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Gunby
v. Yates, 102 S.E.2d 548, 550 (Ga. 1958); Stewart v. Verde River Irrigation & Power Dist., 68 P.2d
329, 334-35 (Ariz. 1937).
25. See FOSTER, supra note 20, at 107.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 189-217, for a full explanation of the way the phenomenon known as "full-line
forcing" operates in local government finance allocation. According to Professor Foster, services
that are funded with protected revenue streams capture a bigger slice of the budget than when those
same services compete for revenues in a local government's general purpose revenue debate. See
id. See also COLMAN, supra note 23, at 10-13, where the author describes the political impact of
increased local government user charges. He notes that user fees create a protected stream of
revenue that is not "unbundled" at general revenue and budget sessions. Id.
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parcel of land (and its improvements) located within the taxing unit's
territorial jurisdiction. To a much lesser extent, and depending on the scope
of state enabling authority, some local governments levy sales taxes,2" use
taxes,29 and/or income taxes. 30 The property tax, however, is by far the
taxation device most commonly used by local governments.3'
In fundamental contrast to taxes, local government dues crucially
depend on the relationship between the payer and the purpose for which
the revenue raised will be spent. That is, by calculating the charge with a
computation of the benefit received by the payer or to offset the cost
imposed on the general population by the payer's activity, dues treat
government activities just like any other market transaction in a consumer
economy. As a result, dues have a privatizing effect on government
services.32 In addition, if they are levied on all users equally, dues may be
more regressive in their impact than taxes.33

28. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Fayetteville, 76 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Ark. 2002) (upholding
use of local sales tax revenue for construction of city center). Just like the property tax, the sales
tax is somewhat regressive; consumption constitutes a higher percentage ofannual income for lower
income families. See ALTSHULER & GOMEz-IBAREz, supra note 23, at 107. That regressivity may
be offset by excluding from the sales tax levy basic needs like food and clothing. Id. The local
component of the sales tax, however, is generally minimal in comparison to the overall sales tax
rate, which is often levied at the state level.
29. See, e.g., H & R Roofing of S.D., Inc. v. Dep't ofRevenue, 623 N.W.2d 508, 510 (S.D.
2001) (upholding imposition of municipal use tax levied on building materials bought elsewhere
and used within municipality).
30. See, e.g., Fisher v. Neusser, 660 N.E.2d 435,440 (Ohio 1996) (upholding application of
local income tax to taxpayer's lottery winnings). The Ohio courts have been particularly protective
of local taxation powers. See, e.g., Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 693 N.E.2d 212,
214 (Ohio 1998) (upholding local net profits tax as a legitimate exercise of delegated home rule
authority). According to a 1993 study by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, only nine state constitutions expressly authorize local taxation powers (Colorado,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, New York, Utah, and Wyoming). U.S. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY: NEEDS FOR
STATECONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, ANDJUDICIALCLARIFICATION 14, 20 n.64 (1993). In all other

states, local power to tax must be delegated by state law. Id. at 14.
31. As of 1997, property tax revenue comprised 61% of total local government own-source
revenues. I U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1997-1998 CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS: COMPENDIUM OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES tbl. 1 (2001).

32. FOSTER, supra note 20, at 107. In general, dues techniques are regressive in their effect.
User charges for basic infrastructure, for instance, tend to be constant across income level. One

study of impact fees and other exactions on development concluded that they shift wealth from
older to younger and from poorer to more affluent home buyers. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBARJZ,
supra note 23.
33. In general, dues are more regressive than property taxes. That is, their burden falls more
heavily on the poorer segments of a community. For many government services, consumption levels
do not vary with income; thus, the poor pay a higher percentage of their income than the affluent.
In a study of land use exactions and impact fees, the authors concluded that user fees are more
regressive than property taxes, but considerably less regressive than the current common practice
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Local governments have a wide range of dues techniques at their
disposal. These include: fees to use government-owned facilities, like a
public transit system;34 assessments levied against property owners to pay
for a locale-specific capital improvement, like sidewalks or street lights;35
regulatory fees designed to offset the negative impact of private sector
activity, like a fee imposed on paint producers to counteract the effects of
lead poisoning;" or charges based on consumption of a governmentprovided service, like garbage collection or'local utility service.37 Though
they employ a wide variety of implementation techniques and computation
formulae, and though their validity depends on a number ofdevice-specific
legal tests, the underlying premise is the same for all dues techniques: dues
can be levied so long as the person or property being charged stands in
direct and substantial relationship to the reason for which the charge has
been assessed. Thus, dues are legitimate when the party assessed directly
benefits from the government action being funded,38 when the charge
recoups the costs of the payer's use of government property or services,39
or when the cost is levied to offset the negative impact of the activity

of community imposed exactions, i.e., the practice of conditioning development approval on
developer contribution of a wide range of infrastructure improvements. See ALTSHULER& GOMEZIBAREZ, supra note 23.
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1034 (2d Cir. 1995); see
also LCM Enters. v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675, 680-81 (1st Cir. 1994) (local fee for use of
town harbor); Bd. of Supervisors v. Massey, 173 S.E.2d 869, 870-71 (Va. 1970); Bd. of
Supervisors v. Massey, 169 S.E.2d 556, 559-60 (Va. 1969) (both cases describing the complex
financing scheme for the construction and operation of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan subway
system).
35. See, e.g., McNally v. Township of Teaneck, 379 A.2d 446, 447 (N.J. 1977) (upholding
assessment for sidewalk); Pluimer v. City of Belle Fourche, 549 N.W.2d 202, 206 (S.D. 1996)

(same).
36. See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Cal.
1997); see also Hager v. City of W. Peoria, 84 F.3d 865, 873-74 (7th Cir. 1996) (approving a fee
charged by the city for issuing a permit to regulate truck weight because of the additional burden
on streets attributable to heavy trucks).
37. See, e.g., City of New Smyrna Beach v. Fish, 384 So. 2d 1272, 1276 (Fla. 1980)
(upholding the validity of a special assessment for mandatory garbage disposal system); Raab v.
Town of Schererville, 766 N.E.2d 790,793-94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding town's flat fee for
garbage collection regardless of whether individual residents used a different means of disposal);
J.K. Constr., Inc. v. W. Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 519 S.E.2d 561, 564 (S.C. 1999) (upholding
a fee for sewer service).
38. See, e.g., Blaser v. East Bay Township, 617 N.W.2d 742, 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding that undeveloped wetlands that would not benefit from a sewer system could not be
assessed to fund it); 2nd Roc-JerseyAssocs. v. Town ofMorristown, 731 A.2d 1, 10-11 (N.J. 1999)
(upholding charge on downtown properties providing the benefit of funding enhanced services).
39. See, e.g., Gelhaus & Brost, Inc. v. City of Medford, 423 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988).
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subject to the charge.4" Other traditionally mentioned indicia of dues
techniques are that the charge must be commensurate with the benefit
received or with the impact being offset;4 ' that some dues techniques,
unlike taxes, are voluntarily assumed obligations, in the sense that the
payer has chosen to engage in the activity for which the charge is
assessed;42 and that dues revenues must be segregated to pay only for the
activities for which the charges are levied.43 In short, and in fundamental
contrast to taxpayers, those who pay dues are legally entitled to benefit
from their payment, and the government is required to account to the payer
in ways that do not apply when taxes are involved.
This Article's evaluation of local government dues is based on a
generalized two-part categorization of local government finance powers,
in which all local revenue raising devices can be labeled as either dues or
taxes. Of the many state" and federal45 limits on local taxation powers, the

40. See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co., 937 P.2d at 1356 (fee properly assessed against paint
producers to offset negative impact of lead poisoning); Baker v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 657 N.E.2d
480, 482 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (upholding fee imposed on developers of wetlands to alleviate
government costs associated with protecting those lands from adverse development).
41. See, e.g., S & P Enters. v. City of Memphis, 672 S.W.2d 213,215 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)
(noting that a true license fee should be fixed to cover the expense of issuing it).
42. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Quik Cash Jewelry & Pawn, Inc., 811 So. 2d 756, 758 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (fees, as distinguished from taxes, are paid by choice); Graham v. Township
of Kochville, 599 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (one of the criteria of a fee is
voluntariness).
43. See, e.g., City of Marion v. Baioni, 850 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Ark. 1993); Loomis v. City of
Hailey, 807 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Idaho 1991).
44. Local governments are generally confined in their abilities to levy taxes by limited or
nonexistent enabling authority. See, e.g., Margola Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 854 P.2d 23, 29
(Wash. 1993) (en banc) (stating that the "authority to tax cannot be implied from a local
government's general powers," and that "local governments may tax only pursuant to specific
legislative or constitutional authority"). Local governments are further limited by the common state
constitutional "public purpose" requirement, which mandates that benefits of taxation be in
common and not for the primary benefit of particular persons or interests. See, e.g., City of
Lexington v. Hager, 337 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (explaining that the plain meaning of
the state constitution's public purpose clause is that "taxes may be levied and collected only for a
public purpose of the particulartax levying unit").
45. Federal limits on state and local taxation involve equal protection, due process, and the
Commerce Clause. The Equal Protection Clause limits a local government's ability to differentiate
between classes of individuals for the purpose of taxation. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11
(1992); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989). The Due
Process Clause requires that an individual have connections with the taxing government that are
substantial enough to justify its exercise of taxing power. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel.
Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 306 (1992). The Commerce Clause prohibits local taxes that operate to
discriminate against interstate commerce. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 278 (1977); M & Assocs. v. City of Irondale, 723 So. 2d 592, 597 (Ala. 1998) (holding that
local taxation of a nonresident company doing business within city borders discriminates against
interstate commerce when imposition of similar taxes by other local governments would result in
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nearly universal state law requirement of uniformity of taxation is perhaps
the most important in establishing the boundaries between the two
classifications I have suggested. Although a detailed analysis of the legal
parameters of local taxation powers is beyond the scope of this Article, a
brief review of the uniformity principle is crucial to understanding the key
differences between dues and taxes in local government finance.
B. Uniformity of Taxation
Whether it is articulated in a separate constitutional provision46 or
incorporated within the state judiciary's interpretation of another
constitutional clause,47 the uniformity principle establishes the fundamental
norms that classifications of taxpayers must be reasonable4" and that
treatment of taxpayers within classes must be equal.49 It does not, of
multiple taxation).
46. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1, Ill(a) ("[All! taxation shall be uniform upon the same
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."); ME. CONST. art. IX,
§ 8 ("All taxes upon real and personal estate . . . shall be apportioned and assessed equally
according to the just value thereof."); see also MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 3;N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 1,
1(a); PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. Many state constitutions were amended to require uniformity of
taxation during the late 1800s in response to many perceived legislative abuses of taxing and
spending powers. See Kristin E. Hickman, High Court Studies, The More Things Change, the More
they Stay the Same: Interpretingthe PennsylvaniaUniformity Clause,62 ALB. L. REV. 1695, 1699
(1999).
47. In some states, the uniformity principle is derived from general equal protection analysis
See, e.g., Medlock v. Leathers, 842 S.W.2d 428, 430-31 (Ark. 1992). In others, it is derived from
a state constitutional prohibition of special legislation. See, e.g., Desenco, Inc. v. City of Akron,
706 N.E.2d 323, 330 (Ohio 1999).
48. In some states, the constitutional uniformity clause explicitly allows reasonable
classifications. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b) ("[C]lassification [of real property in certain
counties] shall be reasonable and assessments shall be uniform within each class."); MINN. CONST.
art. X, § 1 ("Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects...."); WASH. CONST. art. VII,
§ I ("All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property.... ."). In others, the power to
classify is derived from general taxation powers. See, e.g., McBreairty v. Comm'r ofAdmin. & Fin.
Servs. 663 A.2d 50, 54 (Me. 1995) (upholding classification of different taxing districts,
notwithstanding constitutional language that on its face required absolute uniformity); Medlock, 842
S.W.2d at 430-31 (upholding extension of sales tax to cable television services but not to satellite
television services). In a small number of jurisdictions, the uniformity clause explicitly prohibits
classifications, thus requiring equal tax rates for all real property within the jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the
territorial limits of the authority levying the tax .... All real estate shall constitute one class ... ").
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that the uniformity clause requires both a uniform tax
rate and equality in the assessment value of all property. See Boeing Co. v. King County, 449 P.2d
404, 407 (Wash. 1969).
49. See, e.g., Kankakee County Bd. of Review v. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd., 544 N.E.2d 762,771
(I11. 1989); McBreairty, 663 A.2d at 54; Grand Traverse County v. State, 538 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich.
1995); In re Opinion of the Justices (Mun. Tax Exemptions for Indus. Constr.), 697 A.2d 120, 124
(N.H. 1997); Kendall v. Douglas, Grant, Lincoln & Okanogan Counties Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 6,820
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course, guarantee that all taxpayers will pay the same number or total
amount of taxes. Rather, the uniformity principle focuses on the
relationships between the parties to be taxed and the distinctions between
those taxed and those not taxed; it limits the government's flexibility in
establishing the source of tax revenue, but it has no bearing on the
government's ultimate use of tax revenue. 0
As a result of this extremely broad discretion, an important corollary of
the uniformity principle is the legal irrelevancy of the taxpayer's assertion
that he or she will receive no benefit from the service being funded by
taxes. Taxpayers, for instance, state no claim for relief from local taxes by
showing that they have no children in the schools funded by those taxes."1
Although that bright line has eroded with the relatively recent ascension of
very narrowly drawn tax classifications and the spread of so-called
"benefit ' 52 or "special"" taxes, uniformity has traditionally been a
guarantee that taxpayers will be treated reasonably when asked to make a
financial contribution to the enhancement of the general welfare, not that
taxpayers will receive individual benefits from general tax levies.

P.2d 497, 503-04 (Wash. 1991) (en banc).
50. The goals of local taxation must meet the standards set in state constitutional public
purpose clauses, that taxes be "levied and collected for public purposes only." See, e.g., WASH.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; see also ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6 ("No tax shall be levied ... except for a
public purpose");N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1) ("the power of taxation shall be exercised.., for public
purposes only .... "); TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("Taxes shall be levied and collected by general
laws and for public purposes only.").
51. See, e.g., Swanson v. State Dep't of Educ., 544 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Neb. 1996) (holding
that having no children in school district is not a valid basis for exemption from school taxes);
Davis v. County of Greenville, 443 S.E.2d 383, 386 (S.C. 1994) (rejecting city taxpayer's claim that
county unlawfully levied taxes within city to provide services outside of city but within county);
Kendall, 820 P.2d at 503 (rejecting claim that uniformity clause guarantees that taxpayers will
receive "equivalent cost benefit ratios" between tax and benefit).
52. The erosion of this dividing line has resulted in an increasingly dues-like benefit standard
in judicial evaluation of some local taxation devices. For judicial evaluation of benefit taxes, see,
e.g., Allegro Services Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 665 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill.
1996); Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority, 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (I11.
1992). The Illinois Supreme Court's opinions repeatedly mention the degree of taxpayer benefit
from the challenged taxes.
53. See, e.g., Leonard v. Thornburgh, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Pa. 1985), where the court
upheld a tax classification that distinguished residents from non-residents on the basis of its
observation that these two groups receive different levels of local services in exchange for those
services. To the extent that the courts incorporate a consideration of benefit into their analysis of
the uniformity of the tax, the line between tax and dues becomes less clear. For a detailed discussion
of benefit taxes and special taxes, see discussion infra Part II.D.5.
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C. Dues vs. Taxes: How Does the Government Decide?
Though local government funding decisions undoubtedly rest on a
variety of case-specific considerations, some generalizations are possible.
At least ten factors may be important to a local government's choice
between dues and taxes in any situation. 4 Prior to 1970, the primary
considerations tended to derive from the first six factors listed below. Up
until that time, local governments typically used a mixture of dues and
taxes, but resorted to dues relatively infrequently." Beyond the application
of whatever legal restrictions were imposed on the use of dues, their
popularity appears to have been limited by a broad community consensus
that the cost
of many government services should be borne equally by all
56
taxpayers.

Over the past thirty years, however, that attitude has changed and a
number of additional considerations now factor into the government's
choice between dues and taxes, described in factors seven through ten.
Though this compilation is undoubtedly neither complete nor predictive of
every specific case, it encapsulates the major forces at work in most local
government financing decisions. In any given situation, different factors
may be in conflict; several may argue for adopting a dues technique, while
several others push towards a taxing mechanism. The ultimate balance
struck will depend on a community's assessment of the competing factors
and may result in a compromise between taxes and dues. For instance, the
government may believe that user fees would properly reduce consumption
of a scarce resource, but at the same time not want to allocate the resource
solely on the ability to pay. In that case, the government may choose to
subsidize usage by the poor or to establish income-sensitive sliding scales
for fee rates. 57 Thus, the following discussion does not purport to be a
predictive guide to the local government's decision, but rather a suggestion

54. In any particular case, of course, local government may choose to combine both dues and
taxation techniques. For instance, the government may fund the necessary infrastructure from tax
revenue and impose user fees to cover operating costs. See COLMAN, supra note 23, at 17. The
factors listed here are likely to apply in the government's determination of the overall allocation
between the two devices.
55. Some dues techniques, specifically special assessments, have been used since colonial
times. ALTsHuLER & GOMEZ-IBAIRZ, supranote 23, at 17. Prior to 1970, however, the use of dues
was limited because of the prevalent community attitude that when new infrastructure and services
were needed, "government should simply adopt broad-based taxes and get on with the job." Id. at
12. Dues techniques were used sparingly when the government concluded that "property owners,
over and above paying normal taxes, should in some cases bear the cost of new infrastructure
traceable to their activities." Id. at 17.
56. See id. at 12.
57. See COLMAN, supra note 23, at 20 (noting that if a service provides a significant general
community benefit, fees can be used so long as the low income segment of the community is
protected, either with a sliding scale charge or total subsidization of the cost of service).
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of a multiplicity of often competing considerations likely to be relevant to
the ultimate choice of financing technique. What is noteworthy or unusual
about the listing of factors is not that the range of important considerations
has increased over the past three decades, but rather how the more recent
factors so completely weigh in on the side of dues. Thus, in the early years
of the twenty-first century, it is no surprise that dues are becoming the
financing mechanism of choice for local governments. 8
1. Congruence Between Users and Tax Base
In general, the greater the congruence between user base and tax base,
the greater the likelihood that taxation will be used to finance the
government undertaking. Conversely, as the disparity between these two
groups increases, it becomes more likely that the local government will
resort to a dues technique. Lack of congruence may arise in one of two
ways. First, it occurs if a government service is used by many individuals
who are not subject to the local government's taxation powers; for
example, when non-residents avail themselves of city services59 or when
the taxing jurisdiction has tax-exempt property within its borders.6 °
58. Between 1957 and 1997, the increase in local government reliance on dues was quite
marked. In 1957 approximately 80% of total local own-source revenues came from taxes, with only
20% derived from charges, assessments, and other fees; in 1997, those figures had changed to
approximately 62%coming from local taxes and 38% from local government dues techniques. 1957
CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES, supra note 19, tbl.6; 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT
FINANCES, supra note 18, tbl.2; see also ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBAREZ, supra note 23, at 18-33
(describing the increase in developer fees and the profound shift in community attitudes about
growth that occurred during the 1970s). Moreover, the statistics do not tell the whole story. Most
communities require, as a condition of development approval, extensive in-kind contributions by
the developer, like streets, sidewalks, and other basic infrastructure. The value of these
improvements does not show up in the computations of government revenue described above. Id.
at 17; see also discussion infraPart II.D.4. One study notes how user charges are no longer limited
to big cities and a few traditional functions, like utilities, public transit, and parking. COLMAN,
supra note 23, at 6. Recently, many smaller municipalities have adopted dues techniques. Id.
Moreover, the range of services funded has expanded well beyond that original core, to include
libraries, public health, fire protection, emergency rescue services, and special police protection,
all of which were previously funded through general taxation revenues. See id.
59. See, e.g., City of Texarkana v. Wiggins, 246 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. 1952) (finding city
could properly charge nonresident users of municipally-owned water and sewer systems at higher
rates provided city showed a reasonable basis for the difference); see also City of Philadelphia v.
Kenny, 369 A.2d 1343, 1353-54 (Pa. 1977) (stating that the Philadelphia Wage Tax withstands
constitutional challenge by nonresident federal employees who work within the city and use
services provided by the city); Platt v. Town of Torrey, 949 P.2d 325, 332-33 (Utah 1997)
(upholding higher charge to non-residents for use of municipal water system). Local government
fees may also differentiate residents from non-residents. See LCM Enters. v. Town of Dartmouth,
14 F.3d 675, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1994) (upholding harbor usage fees that distinguished resident from
nonresident boaters).
60. Tax-exempt properties are generally not exempt from properly levied dues techniques.
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Second, lack of congruence occurs if a government service is provided to
a well-defined and narrow subset of the government's taxing
population-for example, when the government offers adult education
courses to its residents.6 ' In both cases, use of local tax dollars may be seen
as unfairly providing a special benefit, and dues techniques may be an
attractive way to recoup the costs of a service that is provided to a group
that is not coterminous with the local government's taxing territory.
2. General Welfare Concerns
Though local government decisions to provide infrastructure or services
will undoubtedly be the result of a complicated balancing of many
competing policy considerations,62 general social policy concerns are
usually salient in the local government's decision whether to use taxes or
dues. Most fundamentally, if the service or infrastructure is deemed to
provide an important benefit to the general welfare, dues will be an
inappropriate revenue raising technique. This general welfare factor may
come from an independent state constitutional clause- like a guarantee of
free public schools 63 -or an equal protection or due process
See, e.g., Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d 180, 184 (Fla. 1996)
(holding religious organizations subject to stormwater management service assessment); Town of
Winthrop v. Winthrop Housing Auth., 541 N.E.2d 582,583-84 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that
public housing authority must pay annual sewer system fee); Sch. Dist. No. 1, Lewis and Clark
County v. City of Helena, 287 P. 164, 166 (Mont. 1930) (holding a school district, though exempt
from local property taxes, subject to assessment for streets and sewers); Kent County Water Auth.
v. State (Dep't of Health), 723 A.2d 1132, 1136-37 (R.I. 1999) (county government agency is
subject to state fee for public water supply system); King County Fire Prot. Dists. 16, 36, & 40 v.
Housing Auth., 872 P.2d 516, 524 (Wash. 1994) (finding local special district subject to county
benefit charges for fire protection); City of Clarksburg v. Grandeotto, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 177, 182 (W.
Va. 1998) (finding religious educational institution subject to municipal service fee for fire and
flood protection).
61. See COLMAN, supra note 23, at 10.
62. Though taxation is generally a revenue raising device, numerous policy considerations
factor into the decisions about classifications. See, e.g., Medlock v. Leathers, 842 S.W.2d 428, 431
(Ark. 1992) (finding government's decision to tax cable television providers while exempting
satellite providers from same tax reflects state's policy determination to encourage satellite
providers to enter rural areas). Thus, when the government decides to tax one use of property at a
different rate than another, it has made a policy judgment about favoring one use over another, such
as when it establishes preferential tax rates for homeowners or farmland. The point made in the text
refers more narrowly to the principal policy factors relevant to the government's choice between
dues and taxes.
63. See, e.g., Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 43 (Cal. 1984) (en banc) (finding all
educational activities, including extracurricular musical and athletic activities, fall within the state
constitution's guarantee of free school); Randolph County Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 467 S.E.2d 150,
155 (W. Va. 1995) (holding mandatory requirement of a thorough and efficient system of free
schools in state constitution prohibited charge for books). Cf Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist. v. State
Dep't of Educ., 825 P.2d 438,446 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (holding charge for bus transportation did
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consideration.' In general, though, commonly accepted values about the
government's obligation to provide essential services and deeply held
convictions about the public benefit of those services65 will operate to
restrain the zeal with which local government seeks to recoup the cost of
some services from the user." In those cases, wealth or disposable income
is seen as an unacceptable criterion for allocation of the service.67
3. Efficiency and Conservation
An important consideration in the provision of local services may be
the extent to which the government desires to limit consumption of
resources. This may be based on: (1) general efficiency concerns about
enhancing its ability to provide the best service at the lowest cost; (2)
environmentally based goals to conserve resources and limit consumption;
or (3) a more general aim to reduce the government's need to expand its
service capacity. If the cost of a service is directly related to usage, the
government can reasonably expect to see greater self-imposed limits on
consumption than would occur if the service were financed through general
tax revenues and provided "free of charge" to the public.68 In theory, user
charges and other dues devices should be more efficient than taxation
techniques, because they guarantee that those who place the highest value
on the service will be the ones to use it. Although the appropriateness of
using market principles in the allocation of government services is subject

not violate the state constitution's guarantee of free common schools because transportation is not
an essential element of school activity).
64. See, e.g., Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 388 P.2d 720, 722-24 (Cal. 1964) (en
banc), vacatedon other grounds, 380 U.S. 194 (1965), aff'd on remand,400 P.2d 312 (Cal. 1965)
(en banc) (holding state requirement that parents pay cost of child's involuntary confinement in
state mental institution violates state equal protection guarantee, noting that "the purpose[s] of
confinement and treatment or care ... encompass the protection of society from the confined
person"); Dep't of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 379 P.2d 22, 28 (Cal. 1963).
65. See, e.g., State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 745 (Haw. 1999) (invalidating use of service
fee to recoup cost of prosecution, noting that "[e]ven assuming, arguendo,that a convicted person
receives some benefit from his experience with the guiding hand of the law, clearly the principal
purpose of the penal system is to benefit society, not those who break the law").
66. Professor Frug refers to "admission to public schools or public parks" as examples of
services that cannot be based on ability to pay,just as "voting rights, jury duty, and military service"
are public commodities that cannot be sold to the highest bidder. See Frug, supra note 9, at 31; see
also ALTSHULER &GMEZ-IBAREZ, supranote 23, at 113 (stating that societal consensus about the
importance of services likely factors into choice between dues and taxes).
67. Conversely, of course, if the service is likely to be used by upper income users, tax
financing may be unacceptable because it would result in subsidization of higher income groups
by lower income taxpayers. See CoLMAN, supranote 23, at iv.
68. Depending on the sophistication of the fee structure, user fees may both reduce overall
consumption on an absolute basis and reallocate consumption by reducing congestion during peak
usage periods. See id. at 6.
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to considerable scholarly debate,6 9 use of a dues technique is likely to result
in a lower level of consumption of a service or use of a government
product than will occur if the government uses general tax revenues.
4. Local History
The way a local government has funded services in the past will have
a bearing on the perceived fairness of its choice between taxation and
dues.7" For instance, if the cost of new sidewalks has always been borne
directly by the neighborhood property owners abutting the improvement,
shifting to tax financing will likely be seen as unfair to the property owners
who have paid for their own sidewalks in the past and who would now
have to contribute to others' sidewalks through general tax revenues.
Conversely, if a particular public improvement has long been financed out
of general tax revenues, a government decision to shift to some more
narrowly targeted dues technique will raise the objection that the service
user, who has paid for other users in the past through tax payments, is now
unfairly being asked to bear a burden that the general community had
previously assumed.7 '

69. That approach originated with the publication of Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956). Since that time, however, commentators have
questioned whether local government services should be allocated according to market principles
and whether it is accurate to say that those most able to pay for a service are necessarily the ones
who give it the highest value. Some scholars reject the model of city-as-service-provider and
contend that local governments should serve citizens' need "to participate actively in the basic
societal decisions that affect one's life." Gerald E. Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV.
L. REv. 1059, 1068 (1980). As Professor Frug has noted, "[p]eople who live in unsafe
neighborhoods or send their children to inadequate schools don't do so because they have taste for
them.... If they had a choice.... they would prefer better schools and less crime." See Frug, supra
note 9, at 31 (internal citations omitted). For a full critique of Tiebout's analysis of local
governments, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLuM. L. REv. 346, 399-435 (1990). For additional discussion of the localist debate, see
Reynolds, supra note 2, at 100-19.
70. This factor is a "venerable one." See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration
ofBenefit Taxation: SpecialAssessments in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201,
238 & n. 163 (1983) (quoting documents from pre-Civil War New York and noting that "fairness
required that the costs of the.... improvement be imposed on abutting landowners, because that was
how such improvements had been financed before").
71. Although the court in Heavens v. King County RuralLibraryDistrict,404 P.2d 453,45455 (Wash. 1965), invalidated the use of dues to finance a public library on general policy grounds,
the opinion did note that the challenged legislation authorized a shift from tax funding to a
narrower, property-based fee. Although the inertia of local practice may be an important
consideration, radical shifts in government financing patterns do occur. The enormous increase in
locally imposed development fees and exactions, for instance, dramatically changed the way the
costs of growth are allocated. See ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBAMEZ, supra note 23, at 19-33, 123-25.
Up until approximately 1970, the costs of growth were often borne by the community, with
infrastructure funded out of general taxation revenues. See id. Since that time, the shift to dues
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5. Potential for Specialization
Tax revenues are usually deposited into the general revenues fund,
meaning they are not earmarked or collected with a commitment to allocate
them to any particular use. A dues technique offers several possibilities for
specialization not available when general purpose governments collect
general-tax revenues. It may, for instance, allow the government to
establish a separate, single purpose government unit, like a special district
or public authority, whose powers are carefully limited to the provision of
the service. Or it may simply provide a predictable revenue stream that can
be explicitly earmarked to pay the costs of the service or infrastructure.
Specialization may be particularly attractive, for instance, if the natural
market for a service does not reflect the political boundaries of the taxing
authority or if a protected revenue stream is needed to secure market
financing.72
6. Political Incentives
At least two longstanding purely political incentives have been a factor
in local government decisions about financing a new service or building a
new infrastructure. First is the pressure not to redistribute that comes from
high tax-paying members of the community.73 This incentive is particularly
acute for local governments that rely extensively on the property tax
revenue of businesses, which, in general, have high assessed values and
low service needs. In this instance, the local government will undoubtedly
feel pressure not to use tax financing for services unlikely to be seen as a
benefit by the business property owner. Moreover, businesses may often
use the threat of relocation to a local government with a lower tax rate to
encourage less government reliance on general taxes.74
In addition, the realities of political representation will undoubtedly
provide an incentive for local government to seek a way to impose costs

techniques like fees has squarely placed the cost of growth on the developer, who ultimately passes
that cost on to the home buyer. See id.
72. See COLMAN, supra note 23, at 15-17; FOSTER, supra note 20, at 97, 107. But see Kent
County Water Auth. v. State (Dep't of Health), 723 A.2d 1132, 1136 (R.I. 1999) (stating that
simply because funds are deposited into general treasury does not convert them into taxes).
73. See Briffault, supranote 69, at 408.
74. Id at 407-09 ("Contemporary cities, as a rule, do not engage in innovative redistributive
programs, not because they lack the legal authority, but rather because they fear that initiating such
programs would cause residential and commercial taxpayers to depart."); see also COLMAN, supra
note 23, at 15 (noting that businesses oppose dues less than taxes and claiming that high tax rates
have a substantial negative impact on the attractiveness of a community for businesses seeking to
relocate). Professor Frug claims that this incentive has produced a municipal rush-to-the-bottom
to entice businesses with greater tax breaks. See Frug, supra note 9, at 33-34.
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on those who have no voice in its political process.75 Thus, proposals to
charge outsiders76 or transients 77 are unlikely to create as effective a public
opposition as taxing residents who can use the political process to voice
their displeasure with the actions of their local representatives.7" Whether
this is merely a politically expedient way for a local government to raise
additional revenue or whether it reasonably responds to the reality that the
government needs to receive a contribution from those who use its services
but are immune from most of its taxation powers depends, of course, on
the eye of the beholder.79

75. This point is related to, but distinct from, the issue of congruence discussed supra in the
text and accompanying notes 57-59. It focuses more exclusively on the ways in which sheer
political power may constitute an independent incentive for the government to over-charge those
who have no political voice in their jurisdiction. Airport car rental taxes and hotel taxes are based
on a reasoned decision that non-residents who rent cars in airports or stay in city hotels create more
demand for services and are more likely an expedient choice of target.
76. California's Proposition 13, adopted by voter initiative to severely limit the growth of
property taxes for existing homeowners, illustrates the expediency of taxing outsiders. Upholding
the sharp distinctions in tax burden between existing homeowners and new entrants in the market,
the Court described the initiative as reflecting a "'welcome stranger"' attitude. See Nordlinger v.
Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 6 (1992). A local government may have very limited ability to impose taxes on
non-residents who utilize its services. These limitations are discussed infra at note 79. For a
discussion of the Supreme Court's narrow standard for judging whether taxes discriminate against
outsiders, see Daniel N. Shaviro, An Economic and PoliticalLook at Federalismin Taxation, 90
MICH. L. REv. 895, 948 (1992).
77. Charges on airport parking, car rentals, hotels, and motels are a popular way to shift some
tax burdens to non-residents. See, e.g., Patel v. City of Gilroy, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 354,356 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (hotel accommodation tax of 9%); Allegro Servs., Ltd. v. Metro. Pier & Exposition
Auth., 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (I11.1996) (one dollar to twenty-seven dollar "airport departure tax"
on providers of ground transportation from airports); Ace Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Indianapolis Airport
Auth., 612 N.E.2d 1104, 1106-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding 7% charge on car rental revenue
as a valid airport user fee); Airlines Parking, Inc. v. Wayne County, 550 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Mich.
1996) (30% airport parking facility tax); Bold Corp. v. County ofLancaster, 801 A.2d 469, 471 (Pa.
2002) (3.9% hotel room rental tax and 1.1% hotel excise tax). But see Cont'l Trailways, Inc. v. Div.
of Motor Vehicles, 492 A.2d 1016, 1017 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (holding that a bus
excise tax on interstate bus travel only and exempting intrastate bus travel "is patently not a fair
share and is unjustified... as the implementation of a legislative policy to subsidize indirectly New
Jersey bus companies").
78. In some cases, residents' own economic self-interest will be an adequate substitute for
the non-residents' interest. For instance, hotel owners' opposition to a city hotel tax may guarantee
that the local political process indirectly protects the non-residents. See Gillette, supra note 3, at
210; see also Kirk J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 191, 216-36 (2001)
(describing how the incidence of local taxes may not be limited to those within the taxing
jurisdiction's territory).
79. Perhaps because of the perceived unfairness of taxing people with no political voice,
many state laws impose strict limits on local governments' abilities to tax the income of nonresidents. For instance, in 1968, the California Legislature enacted Government Code section
50026, prohibiting local governments from taxing nonresident employees unless a resident
employee is taxed at the same rate. See County of Alameda v. City & County of San Francisco, 97
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7. Tax Limits
Since the 1970s, and originating in California with Proposition 13, a
fairly large number of states have imposed stringent limits on their local
governments' ability to raise revenue."0 The restrictions are expressed in
a number of ways: in some states, government taxing powers are limited
to a particular dollar amount8 ' or percentage;2 and in others, no new taxes
can be imposed without a super-majority vote of the legislature 3 or vote
of the taxpayers themselves.8 4 Despite the wide variation in the actual
technique employed, the common underlying motivation ofthese taxpayer
"revolts" is the rejection of the argument that limits in government
spending should be achieved during legislative budgeting sessions.8 5 By
putting the spending and taxation limits in state statutes and constitutions,
the voters have tied the hands of politicians and implicitly asserted the
inadequacy of political checks as the proper response to governmental
financial excesses.8 6 Government's response to the caps, however, has been
characterized by increased creativity in looking for ways to raise revenue
without taxing; in nearly all states, fees and other dues techniques are not
subject to the tax caps." Predictably, local governments have resorted to
Cal. Rptr. 175, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971). The California Court of Appeal questioned the
legislature's power to prohibit the city from exercising its inherent power of municipal taxation, but
invalidated the practice nevertheless on the grounds that it denies non-residents equal protection
of the law. Id. at 79-80; see also Igoe v. Pataki, 696 N.Y.S.2d 355, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(invalidating city commuter income tax); Leonard v. Thornburgh, 489 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Pa. 1985)
(noting that the state legislature capped the nonresident wage tax rate to avoid abuse of
unrepresented taxpayers).
80. See ALTSHULER& GOMEZ-IBARlEZ, supra note 23; COLMAN, supra note 23; Stark, supra
note 78, at 197-206.
81. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.080(b) (Michie 2001) (limiting the amount of revenue
from the total municipal property tax to $1,500 per year for each person residing in its boundaries).
82. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b) (placing millage limits on ad valorem taxes at
different rates for municipal, school, water management, and other special district purposes); MICH.
CONST. art. IX, § 6 (limiting total amount of general ad valorem taxes imposed on real and tangible
personal property in any one year to "15 mills on each dollar of the assessed valuation of
property").
83. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (requiring two-thirds vote of legislature for the "levy
of a new tax, an increase in an existing tax, or a repeal of an existing tax exemption").
84. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 4 (requiring two-thirds vote of the qualified electors
of the district to impose special taxes); Mo. CoNST. art. X, § 22(a) (requiring voter approval of any
local government adoption or increase of "tax, license or fees").
85. See Mona Patel, Is Nothing Certainbut Death? The UncertaintyCreatedby California's
Proposition218, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 385, 385 (2001).
86. See COLMAN, supra note 23, at 10.
87. California's Proposition 218 is an exception to this general rule, requiring voter approval
for charges or fees that are imposed upon a parcel of land or upon the owner as an incident of
property ownership or for property-related service. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 6(c). Thus, a fee
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raise revenue without running afoul of the
"non-tax taxes""
aapplicable
number ofrestrictions
on localtotaxation.
8. Financial Pressures
Although the total dollar amount of federal government aid to local
governments has continued to rise, federal aid has steadily decreased when
expressed as a percentage of total local government general revenue. In
1976, around the high-water mark of federal aid to local governments,
federal grants constituted more than 8%of local government income;8 9 by
1997, that percentage had decreased to less than 4%.90 According to one
study, in 1960 the federal government paid for one-half of the total
investment nationwide in core infrastructure (including highways,
transportation, water, and sewer); by the end of the 1980s, its share had
decreased to one-sixth. 91 Coupled with this declining federal support, over
those same decades local governments saw a tremendous increase in the
number and scope of externally imposed legal obligations, many
mandating that local governments provide a service or improved
infrastructure, but which did not provide funding to help pay for the
improvements. 92
on municipal utilities paid by utility rate-payers was found to be subject to voter approval. Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City of Roseville, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91, 95 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding that
the fee for water, sewer, and refuse services fell within the definition of property-related service
because "[tihese services are first necessarily delivered to property, and then, and- only then, to
those living or working on the property"). However, voter approval was not required for a fee
imposed on residential rental properties for the purpose of funding a program to eradicate
substandard housing. See Apartment Ass'n of L.A. County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 14 P.3d
930,936 (Cal. 2001) (finding that the exaction was not imposed on landlords in that capacity, but
was "more in the nature of a fee for a business license than a charge against property"). For a
history of Propositions 13 and 218, see generally Patel, supra note 85.
88. That term comes from a recently published casebook and was coined by Richard Briffault.
See WIIUAM D. VALENTE Er AL., CASES AND MATERIuS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
540 (5th ed. 2001).
89. 1977 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES, supra note 19, tbl.2.
90. 1997 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT FINANCES, supra note 18, tbl.2.
91. See ALTSHULER& GOMEZ-IBA9EZ, supranote 23, at 128.
92. See id. at 31-32, 63; see also, PIETRO S. NIVOLA, LAWS OF THE LANDSCAPE: How
POLICIEs SHAPE CrrmEs IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 80 (1999) (showing the $150 billion gap between
the cost to governments of implementing federal regulation and the amount of federal budget
outlays to meet those costs). The costs of federal mandates are frequently recognized in the caselaw.
See, e.g., Coalition Against Columbus Ctr. v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1992)
(describing citizen suit maintained under the Clean Air Act to enforce city's implementation plan
to mitigate carbon monoxide pollution); Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich.
1998) (describing federally imposed mandates under Clean Water Act and the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination Standards); Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 517 S.E.2d
874, 876-77 (N.C. 1999) (describing federal mandates under the Water Quality Act, and noting the
absence of federal funding to support the development of comprehensive storm-water management
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At the same time, the internal backlog of demand for repair and upgrade
to existing infrastructure to maintain the status quo increased at a rapid
rate. This backlog can be traced to a shift in priorities in state and national
policies that began in the mid 1960s-away from physical infrastructure,
and instead favoring an increase in spending on social programs in the
defense budget.93 Because high quality infrastructure can tolerate a fairly
substantial amount of deterioration before a crisis arises, the country was
able to tolerate the substantial decrease in infrastructure spending for
nearly two decades. By the mid-1980s, however, numerous local
governments were faced with infrastructure crises.94
Of course, neither of these two financial pressures necessarily compels
a government decision to use dues over taxes. Governments could have
used general tax revenues to replace lost federal funds or to fulfill
mandates from higher levels of government. When coupled with the
growing prevalence of tax limits, however, the increasingly dramatic need
for more revenues (coming from the local, state, and federal level) further
pushes local governments to adopt more and more dues to fund new
infrastructure.
9. Make Growth Pay Its Own Way
Before 1970, growth, development, and increased population were
generally seen as a stimulus to economic improvement and an
enhancement of overall local prosperity. 95 As a result, it seemed fair and
proper to use general tax revenues to fund the infrastructure requirements
programs required under that act); Cloverdale Foods Co. v. City of Mandan, 364 N.W.2d 56, 58
(N.D. 1985) (describing federal environmental mandates requiring substantial improvement in
sewer system).
Some states have constitutional reimbursement provisions to deal with the problems of
unfunded state mandates on local governments, but these provisions have met with varying success
in the courts. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. State, 729 P.2d 202, 203 (Cal. 1987) (concluding
that the state is not required to fund costs associated with state laws increasing the amounts which
local governments as employers must pay in workers' compensation benefits); Town of Wells v.
Town of Ogunquit, 775 A.2d 1174, 1176-77 (Me. 2001) (finding state's revised school funding
formula did not constitute an unfunded mandate since the state did not require the town to raise
taxes or expand or modify its activities). But cf Orr v. Edgar, 670 N.E.2d 1243, 1251 (II1.App. Ct.
1996) (holding state-initiated two-tier system of voter registration constituted an unfunded state
mandate); Durant v. State, 563 N.W.2d 646, 647 (Mich. 1997) (requiring state to pay its share of
the necessary costs of special education services and activities as required by state law). For a
discussion of the burdens placed on local governments by unfunded mandates and the history of
legislative efforts to curb mandates, see VALENTE ET AL., supra note 88, at 246-47; Robert M.
Shaffer, Comment, Unfunded State Mandatesand Local Governments, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1057,
1065-74 (1996).
93. See ALTSHULER & GMEZ-IBAEZ, supranote 23, at 26.
94. See id. at 26-31.
95. See id. at 1.
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of new developments. Spreading the cost of growth across the entire
community rested on the consensus that the entire community was the
ultimate beneficiary of that growth. Starting with the 1970s, however,
community attitudes shifted markedly; growth came to be seen as a
deterrent, rather than a contributor, to a community's high quality of life. 96
If growth imposes a cost on the community, the reasoning goes, it is only
fair to assess the source of the growth with the costs it imposes. To single
out those responsible for growth necessarily means that dues, rather than
taxes, become the revenue raising mechanism for new development.97
Using a wide variety of subdivision regulations, impact fees, hook-up
charges, and other targeted charges, communities have sought to offset
what they perceive as the negative impact of unwanted development.9"
Whether growth actually imposes unreimbursed costs on the community
or whether the growth tends to pay for itself as a fully functional taxpaying
component of the local government where it is located remains hotly
contested. 9 In any event, irrespective of whether local governments
unfairly exact unwarranted costs from those who develop within their
borders, the attitude that growth should pay its own way has spread, and
local dues techniques have continued to multiply over the last three
decades.
10. Judicial Leniency
Though much of the responsibility for the enormous increase in dues
techniques must be placed at the doorstep of the local governments
themselves, the state judiciary has often been willing to facilitate this
profound shift in local government finance. In numerous judicial
opinions,0 0 the courts have bent, stretched, or ignored the traditional

96. See id. at 1-2.
97. See infra Part II.D.4, for a discussion of exactions and impact fees.
98. ALTSHuLER & GOMEZ-IBiAFz, supra note 23, at 2-4.
99. The empirical evidence seems ambiguous at best. See id. at 105-07. For one thing, it is
difficult to separate out the causes of increased infrastructure and service demands. See id. Rises
in the general community standard of living, deterioration ofexisting facilities, and lifestyle changes
are but three ways enhanced-service demands may not be traceable exclusively to new development
See id. The authors conclude, however, that the level of anti-growth dues techniques currently in
use far exceeds the real cost of growth's impact on the community. See id. at 106. As a result, dues
techniques have the regressive effect of transferring wealth from poor to rich and from old to young.
See id
100. Recent opinions written by the Supreme Courts of Iowa, Michigan, and Washington
constitute exceptions to that trend, revealing a rather rare judicial willingness to resist local
governments' attempts to push the envelope of raising revenues through dues. See Home Builders
Ass'n v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339, 350 (Iowa 2002) (including park dedication
fee as impermissible tax); City of Hawarden v. U.S. W. Communications, Inc., 590 N.W.2d 504,
505-06 (Iowa 1999) (holding city's regulatory powers over public streets do not grant authority to
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delineations between taxation and dues. For example, in some cases courts
have weakened the requirement that dues provide a special benefit to the
payer, authorizing the use of fees for general municipal services such as
fire and flood protection.01 Similarly, some courts have disregarded the
voluntariness criterion that traditionally applied to some dues techniques
and have upheld compulsory charges as permissible fees.'02 Segregation of
revenues may no longer be a basic requirement for legitimate dues
financing in some jurisdictions,"°3 and the closely monitored connection
between charges and the cost of providing services has weakened." Dues,
of course, are not generally subject to uniformity limits or state tax caps;
thus, by categorizing charges that bear increasing similarity to taxes as fees
or other non-tax charges, courts provide a convenient way for local
governments to raise general revenues without having to worry about antitax strictures.'

charge a fee for their use); Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Mich. 1998) (finding
storm water service charge an impermissible tax, not a valid fee); Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap
Lake, 23 P.3d 477, 480 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (invalidating standby utility charge as
impermissible tax); Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 333 (Wash. 1995) (en banc)
(invalidating residential street utility charge as unconstitutional tax).
101. See, e.g., Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 145 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (affirming
special assessment to residents of four school districts for maintenance of five existing public
parks); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 721 P.2d 11 I (Cal. 1986) (en banc) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority's willingness to let local government impose cost for public benefit on private
parties); Dean v. Town of Addison, 534 S.E.2d 403, 408 (W. Va. 2000) (upholding user fees for
provision of fire services); City of Clarksburg v. Grandeotto, 513 S.E.2d 177, 182 (W. Va. 1998)
(Maynard, J., dissenting) (strenuously chiding the majority for allowing the local government to
impose fees to recoup the costs of fire service, which he described as "a very basic and historical
government service").
102. See infra Part II.D.3; see also State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 741-42 (Haw. 1999)
(abandoning voluntariness requirement and surveying otherjurisdictions where courts have reached
similar results); Hochstedler v. St. Joseph County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910, 916
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding user fee for mandatory recycling); Rogers v. Oktibbeha County Bd.
of Supervisors, 749 So. 2d 966, 969 (Miss. 1999) (upholding garbage disposal fees assessed by
county on residents who did not use the system).
103. See Kent County Water Auth. v. State (Dep't of Health), 723 A.2d 1132, 1136 (R.I.

1999).
104. Though mathematical precision has never been a requirement, courts seem more willing
to tolerate increases in general government revenues as an "ancillary consequence" of the fee
system. See id. Similarly, in M. View Ltd. Partnershipv. City of Clifton Forge, 504 S.E.2d 371,
376 (Va. 1998) the court rejected a challenge to a substantial increase in the local garbage
collection fee, concluding that the $615,000 surplus it generated did not constitute an impermissible
profit. Moreover, the court deferred to the city's choice of accounting methodology and approved
its decision to maintain a large surplus for future expenses. Id.
105. Undoubtedly, the courts' increasing willingness to classify a revenue device as a
permitted dues technique, rather than invalidate it as an impermissible tax, has been a tremendously
powerful incentive for local governments. In some ways, perhaps, this judicial attitude can be
understood as reflecting a reluctance to let local governments fall into financial crisis and, in a way,
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D. Dues in Local Government Finance
Most local governments have a number of dues techniques at their
disposal. Notwithstanding a fair amount of state specific variation,
generalizations about their legal parameters and their impacts are fairly
easy to draw. This Part describes the principal types of dues employed by
local government and evaluates how their prevalence and scope have
undergone substantial expansion over recent decades.
1. Special Assessments
Of longstanding vintage, the special assessment allows local
governments to provide an improvement to some residents or property
owners and then send them the bill for it. One authority traces its use back
to seventeenth-century America,"° and others note the pre-colonial British
origin of the practice." 7 Early judicial opinions routinely upheld special
assessments as deriving from government powers of taxation but not
bound by state uniformity requirements.'08 The rationale behind the
practice is quite straightforward. In some instances, the government, or
residents themselves, seeks to install or construct an improvement for
which the benefitted group can be narrowly and precisely drawn. If, for
instance, one neighborhood requires new sidewalks or if a group of
property owners petitions for neighborhood street lights, the government
may decide that using general tax revenues would unfairly single out one
subset of the taxpaying population for preferential treatment. A special
assessment allows the government to recoup the cost of some government
projects directly from those who benefit, leaving general tax revenues to
be spent for the community welfare.
As the special assessment became well established in local government
law by the end of the nineteenth century, it was most commonly used to
finance municipal street improvements for newly developed property."
Once that community "entrance fee" was paid, to bring the assessed
saving the people from the results of their own self-imposed tax caps. See, e.g., Carman v. Alvord,
644 P.2d 192, 194 (Cal. 1982) (en banc) (refusing to apply Proposition 13 to ad valorem taxes or
special assessments to pay interest and redemption charges on any indebtedness previously
approved by voters); see also cases cited supra note 87.
106. See ALTSHULER & GOME-IBAfqEZ, supra note 23, at 17.
107. See Reams v. City of Grand Junction, 676 P.2d 1189, 1193 (Colo. 1984) (en banc). One
study, however, in providing an historical analysis of the practice, suggested that the claimed
English origin of special assessments is dubious. See Diamond, supra note 70, at 203-10.
108. See, e.g., Burnett v. Mayor & Common Council of Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76,82-83 (1859);
Gould v. Mayor& City Council of Baltimore, 59 Md. 378, 380-81 (1883); Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio
St. 243, 247-49 (1855); Weeks v. City of Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, 259-61 (1860).
109. See Diamond, supra note 70, at 238.
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property's infrastructure up to the norm of existing development in the
municipality, general tax revenues took over as the standard source of
funds for additional improvements." 0 Thus, the special assessment was the
nineteenth century's original version of a "make growth pay its own way"
technique. In the twenty-first century, however, where land development
generally occurs in large subdivisions rather than on a lot by lot basis, local
governments have adopted different dues techniques and more extensive
infrastructure requirements as the current "entrance fee."'' At the same
time, though, the special assessment has retained its popularity as a local
government financing technique; in fact, the scope of its use has increased
tremendously.
In most jurisdictions, special assessments must satisfy two courtimposed criteria." 2 First, they must provide a special benefit to the
property assessed, which is typically interpreted to mean that the assessed
property will be "'benefited by the improvement over and above the
ordinary benefit which the community in general derive from the
expenditure of the money.""' 3 Second, the amount of the assessment
imposed can be no greater than the value of that special benefit to the
payer." 4 Courts have consistently applied these standards to prohibit the
use of special assessments when the improvement's benefit redounded to
the community as a whole rather than to individual landowners," 5 and to
restrain municipal zeal to impose on abutting landowners the full cost of
improvements that also have a general community benefit." 6

110. See id. at 238-39.
11. See discussion infra Part II.D.4.
112. Some state statutory schemes incorporate the same criteria. See, e.g., Weber v. Kenai
Peninsula Borough, 990 P.2d 611, 615 (Alaska 1999) (quoting state statute requiring special benefit
for municipal special assessment); Ventura Group Ventures, Inc. v. Ventura Port Dist., 16 P.3d 717,
727 (Cal. 2001) (quoting statute that requires "proportional special benefit"); Montgomery County
v. Schultze, 489 A.2d 16, 17 (Md. 1985) (quoting county special assessment ordinance).
113. Williams v. Anne Arundel County, 638 A.2d 74,78 (Md. 1994) (quoting Gould, 59 Md.
at 380); see also City of Englewood v. Weist, 520 P.2d 120, 123 (Colo. 1974) (en banc); Gould,
59 Md. at 380; Wabeke v. City of Holland, 220 N.W.2d 756, 758 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
114. See, e.g., Rogers v. City of St. Paul, 22 Minn. 494, 508 (1876).
115. See, e.g., Ruel v. Rapid City, 167 N.W.2d 541,546 (S.D. 1969); Heavens v. King County
Rural Library Dist., 404 P.2d 453, 458 (Wash. 1965) (en banc).
116. See, e.g., Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1018 (Fla. 1999) (invalidating a
special assessment charged to new properties to fund the same general services the County provided
to all residents, including sheriffservices, libraries, parks, elections services, public health services,
and public works); Dixon Rd. Group v. City of Novi, 395 N.W.2d 211, 217 (Mich. 1986)
(invalidating assessment that was 2.6 times greater than value of property enhancement); Quality
Homes, Inc. v. Village of New Brighton, 183 N.W.2d 555, 559-60 (Minn. 1971) (invalidating a
special assessment on properties immediately served by a trunk sewer that was designed to also
serve non-assessed property).
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Over the years, and with a few noteworthy exceptions, 1 7 that two-part
judicial test has remained constant. Yet the nature of the device itself has
changed dramatically. Review of the modem case law suggests at least
three major departures from its initially limited parameters. First, and most
fundamentally, the special assessment is now used to finance a much wider
variety of local government improvements and infrastructure. The
expansion, however, was incremental and gradual. The first change
occurred when municipalities began to use the assessment not only for the
initial provision of the infrastructure, but again when the time came to
resurface, remodel, or renovate the improvement. Thus, the special
assessment changed from an "entrance fee" to an ongoing cost of
community membership."' The next step was to include in the assessment
not only the cost of building the infrastructure, but also a charge for the
service the infrastructure would provide. With that development, the
special assessment underwent a double modification-it was no longer
limited to physical infrastructure and no longer used exclusively for a onetime fixed charge." 9 From there, it was but one more incremental step to
the use of the special assessment as a means of financing the ongoing
provision of public services, with no underlying infrastructure
improvement attached. For instance, recent judicial opinions have upheld
the use of the special assessments for funding fire protection services, 2 '

117. The Florida Supreme Court has significantly weakened the special benefit requirement,
holding that although special assessments typically are imposed to benefit a specific area or class
of property owners, "this does not mean that the cost of services can never be levied throughout a
community as a whole." Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc. 667 So. 2d 180, 183
(Fla. 1995). The dissent argued that this pronouncement "makes the distinction between a special
assessment and a tax illusory." Id.at 187 (Wells, J., dissenting); see also Harris v. Wilson, 693 So.
2d 945, 948 (Fla. 1997) (upholding special assessment on all unincorporated residential property
in the county for solid waste disposal because, unlike other classes of property, the county was
otherwise unable to adequately obtain payment).
118. The courts may have acquiesced to this change because they lacked a legal principal to
overcome the apparent logic of the expansion. See Blount v. City of Janesville, 31 Wis. 648, 661
(1872) ("The conclusion is inevitable that if a special assessment can be made upon the adjoining
lots for paving the street in the first instance, it can be made for repaving the street ....
119. See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Los Angeles, 61 P.2d 323, 328 (Cal. 1936) ("[Tlhere is no
doubt that the furnishing of electric current comes within the classification of public improvements,
in the same sense as does a permanent building or anything else of a permanent nature used in
public utility construction."); see also Reinken v. Fuehring, 30 N.E. 414, 416 (Ind. 1892)
(upholding special assessment for the cost of street sweeping); Ankeny v. City of Spokane, 159 P.
806, 809 (Wash. 1916) (approving special assessment for provision of electric energy to street
lamps).
120. See, e.g., Purdy v. City of York, 500 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Neb. 1993) (upholding special
assessment for "enhanced fire protection"); Pub. Serv. Co. v. N.W. Rogers County Fire Prot. Dist.,
675 P.2d 134, 135 (Okla. 1984) (affirming special assessment for creation, organization, and
operation of fire protection districts).
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storm water management services, 12 maintenance of existing public
parks, 122 and
general aesthetic improvements for a residential
123
subdivision.

Second, the method used by the government to compute the assessment
has undergone major revision. Originally, the calculation of the assessed
amount on each parcel required application of an individualized formula
that approximated the presumed benefit accruing to the property. 24 In
many modem instances, in contrast, the special assessment is calculated
using the property's assessed valuation, which is, of course, the figure used
for property tax purposes. 125 Finally, courts have loosened limits on the
ways government can define the territory subject to the assessment. While
originally a special assessment could only be levied against a subset of the
taxing body's population, 26 modem examples
frequently involve
127
assessments across the entire jurisdiction.
121. See, e.g., Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d at 182.
122. See, e.g., Knox v. City of Orland, 841 P.2d 144, 152 (Cal. 1992) (en banc)

("[Mjaintenance of a physical improvement may operate to renew and preserve the special benefit
attributable to the improvement.").
123. See, e.g., City of Winter Springs v. State, 776 So. 2d 255, 257, 262 (Fla. 2001).
124. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Town ofWestport, 438 A.2d 768,772 (Conn. 1980) (stating

that the formula used to apportion the cost of a parking facility calculated the "current assessed
valuation of the subject property adjusted to take into account the proximity of the property to the
parking facility and a factor reflecting the number of parking spaces needed by the property");
Schwarz Farm Corp. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 196 N.W.2d 571, 577 (Iowa 1972) (stating that the
formula used to calculate the cost of improvements and repairs in a drainage district involved
visiting each tract assessed to assign each fractional part a "'wet factor"' and a "'proximity factor'
based upon elevation and distance from the improvement involved").
125. See, e.g., Sossoman v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 630 P.2d 1154, 1159 (Kan. 1981)
(holding "special assessment against the value of the land with improvements" is "within the power
of the legislature"); Pub. Serv. Co., 675 P.2d at 142 (holding "apportionment [of special
assessment] based on the assessed value is not impermissible"). But see Crittenton v. Reed, 932
S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (charge on lineal footage unrelated to actual cost of
maintenance, repair, and improvements was not a special assessment, but rather general taxation).
126. See Diamond, supra note 70, at 201.
127. See, e.g., Harris v. Wilson, 693 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1997) (approving special
assessment levied throughout the entire taxing district); Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of
Christ, Inc., 667 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 1995) (upholding special assessment imposed on all
developed property throughout county); Sossoman, 630 P.2d at 1155 (approving special assessment
levied on all real property in four sewer districts).
In many instances, the general purpose local government will form a sub-district solely for
purposes of the assessment. See, e.g., S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875, 877-78
(Cal. 1992) (en banc) (creation of rapid transit district); Cloverdale Foods Co. v. City of Mandan,
364 N.W.2d 56, 57-58 (N.D. 1985) (creation of Sanitary Sewer Improvement District); Bellevue
Plaza; Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 851 P.2d 662, 663 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (Local Improvement
District created for street and sidewalk improvements). Perhaps the most noted example of this
practice is the increasing use of business improvement districts (BIDs), in which the government
levies assessments against commercial properties for downtown services. These districts are
discussed separately in Part II.D.2, infra.
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Change and evolution in government financing practices are, of course,
to be expected. What is notable about the evolution of the special
assessment, however, is the apparent lack of a meaningful underlying
policy rationale for the change. In nearly all cases, the wider use appears
to reflect not an evolving consensus about the best way to finance local
government improvements, but rather the strength of the post-1970 dues
incentives discussed earlier. 2 ' As the local governments continue to seek
ways to fund improvements without running afoul of tax limitations, the
lines between special assessment and tax will continue to be blurred.
Currently, only the most attentive and sophisticated local government
citizen will accurately distinguish taxes from this increasingly widespread
special assessment technique.
A few dissenting state court justices have spoken out in opposition to
local governments' increasing reliance on special assessments. 2 9 For the
most part, they propose a tightening of the special benefit standard as an
antidote to what they see as assessments run wild. Their concerns are well
articulated; these few justices fear the use of assessments to fund "garden
variety ' ' 3 community-wide services and system improvements, which
were once the exclusive province of general tax revenues. As one court
noted, refusing to expand the special benefit standard: "If everything is
special, then nothing is special."'' Though judges may have well-founded
concerns about the expanded use of special assessments, the increasing
128. Courts frequently note the government's incentive to resort to fees as a way around tax
limitations. See, e.g., Horgan v. Dauphin Island Water & Sewer Auth., 409 So. 2d 1359, 1367 (Ala.
1982) (finding levies for drainage improvements are special assessments, and therefore not subject
to constitutional limitations on power to levy taxes on private associations); Knox v. City of Orland,
841 P.2d 144, 148 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (holding levy for maintenance of existing parks is a special
assessment and thus not subject to Proposition 13's restriction on special taxes); 2nd Roc-Jersey
Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 731 A.2d 1, 11 (N.J. 1999) (finding levies to fund a Special
Improvement District are special assessments and therefore not subject to state constitutional
uniformity and exemption clauses).
129. See, e.g., Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 313-14 (Colo. 1989) (en banc)
(Lohr, J., dissenting) ("Road maintenance expenditures are traditional governmental expenditures
that benefit the public at large.... The majority's approach seems to allow any government service
to be financed by a fee that bears some relationship to the benefit produced by the service.");
Harris, 693 So. 2d at 949 (Wells, J., dissenting) ("When there is nothing special about an
'assessment,' logic and common sense dictate that the assessment is a tax."); Water Oak Mgmt.
Corp. v. Lake County, 673 So. 2d 135, 137 & n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), quashedin part, 695
So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1997) ("[Tlhe supreme court has begun to speak in terms of benefit to a particular
'class of property owners.' If this change has substance, the implication for expansion of the use
of special assessments is huge.") (internal citation omitted); Zahner v. City of Perryville, 813
S.W.2d 855, 861 (Mo. 1991) (en banc) (Rendlen, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe improvements here are by
the city upon its own property for use by the public.").
130. The term comes from Justice Wells' dissenting opinion in Harris, 693 So. 2d at 950
(Wells, J., dissenting) (quoting Water Oak Mgmt. Corp., 673 So. 2d at 138).
131. Ventura Group Ventures, Inc. v. Ventura Port Dist., 16 P.3d 717, 727 (Cal. 2001).
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breadth of the device fits quite well within the original parameters of the
nineteenth-century definitions. It is of course undeniable that a wide variety
of government expenditures more directly and specially benefit one subset
of the community than another. In fact, it is hard to think of too many
government services or infrastructure projects that do not provide a special
benefit to some group. 3 2 Although as a matter of logic, the extension ofthe
definition of special benefit may be unassailable, the results for local
government finance are profound. What used to be a device for providing
a few basic capital improvements to a neighborhood as it entered the
community has become a way of raising revenue for general local
government services. This has occurred without much fanfare, perhaps
because the change in standards, though extensive, has produced results
that are neither spectacular nor monumental. Local governments have
generally not used special assessments to fund sports stadiums, airports, or
convention centers. Rather, in a more mundane relentlessness, the changes
have been incremental and subtle, as governments turn increasingly to the
use of dues to finance more and more of their basic infrastructure and
services.
2. Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) 33
Municipalities and other general purpose local governments-counties,
villages, and towns-are not the only local government units with wide-

132. Even those improvements that courts typically invalidate as special assessment funding,
like libraries and convention centers, provide definable and quantifiable benefits to some subset of
the taxing district's total property. Thus, residences in walking distance of a public library might
show a slight property value boost; similarly, commercial properties near a convention center are
likely to enjoy enhanced business transactions because of the increase in traffic caused by the presence of the center. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that courts have not found an identifiable
benefit in the library and convention center cases, but that the opinions reflect an unstated conclusion about the fairness or appropriateness of using a dues technique to provide important
services that should benefit the broader community as well. See Ruel v. Rapid City, 167 N.W.2d
541, 546 (S.D. 1969) (finding special assessment for convention center funding is improper);
Heavens v. King County Rural Library Dist., 404 P.2d 453, 458 (Wash. 1965) (en banc)
(invalidating special assessment for library construction).
133. More broadly, this evaluation of BIDs is applicable to other municipally created, sublocal single purpose governmental units. See, for example, State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. City of Lakewood, 788 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1990) (en banc), where the court
evaluated the creation of a special district in a residential area, whose purpose was to provide
services like "sanitation services, parks and recreational services, street improvements and traffic
safety controls, and transportation services and facilities." Because the district had general property
taxing power, it does not specifically qualify as a dues technique. Nevertheless, the facts that the
district consisted of one neighborhood of a municipality and that it was based upon a quid pro quo
of the narrowly drawn relationship between tax and service, id., place this special district in the
dues rather than tax category. Many special districts, in fact, even those that exercise only taxing
authority, are properly seen as part of the dues phenomenon.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss2/2

30

Reynolds: Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What you Pay For" Mo
TAXES, FEES. ASSESSMENTS, DUES

ranging revenue raising powers. Special districts and public authorities,
which are typically single or limited purpose governments, 3 4 are also
authorized to engage in some money raising activities. Though many are
limited to dues techniques like imposing special assessments, user fees, or
other kinds of charges, some have the power to levy property, sales, or
other types of taxes.'35 Some special districts are regional in scope (thus
encompassing the territory of various municipal governments), some are
co-terminous with general purpose governments like a county or
municipality, and still others comprise a subset of one of those units. BIDs
fall into the last category. Along with other municipally created local
improvement districts, 3 6 the BID's territory is carved out of the
municipality in which it is located, generally for the purpose of stimulating
economic revival for deteriorating central business areas.
Though they may be authorized to raise funds with both taxes and with
dues, BIDs deserve special mention as an important phenomenon in local
governments' increasing reliance on dues. Irrespective ofwhich label more
accurately describes their revenue raising powers in any given case, BIDs
are a clear reflection of the local government dues mentality. Indeed, their
existence is expressly premised on the "get what you pay for"
rationale-they charge a premium to one segment of their population in
order to provide a type and level of service not available to those who only
pay general taxes. Thus, BIDs allow central urban core business areas, 37
neighborhoods, 3 ' or other special sub-districts of the municipality,'39 to
134. See supra notes 20-21.
135. For a general description of special districts and the many ways in which they vary from
state to state, see Reynolds, supra note 2, at 137-49. See generally FOSTER, supra note 20, for
analysis of the creation and financing of single purpose governments.
136. Similar entities include special service areas (SSAs) and redevelopment authorities. See,
e.g., Grais v. City of Chicago, 601 N.E.2d 745, 747 (I11.1992) (special service area to fund new
mass transit system); Downtown Rutland Special Tax Challengers v. City of Rutland, 617 A.2d
129, 130 (Vt. 1992) (special district for promotion of downtown area). Though the terminology may
vary, the underlying concept is identical: They are sub-local government single purpose units
created to provide supplemental services to particular districts, most usually downtown commercial
areas.
137. See, e.g., Evans v. City of San Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601,603 (Ct. App. 1992) (Downtown
San Jose Business Improvement District); Jensen v. City & County of Denver, 806 P.2d 381, 383
(Colo. 1991) (en banc) (Colfax on the Hill Business Improvement District); Foote Clinic, Inc. v.
City of Hastings, 580 N.W.2d 81, 82 (Neb. 1998) (Hastings Downtown Business Improvement
District).
138. See, e.g., State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d at 809 (Academy Park Metropolitan
District); Rasse v. City of Marshall, 18 S.W.3d 486, 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (Salt Fork
Neighborhood Improvement District).
139. See, e.g., Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Coll. Utils. Corp., 689 P.2d 460, 461 (Alaska
1984) (college service area); W. Carroll County Ambulance Dist. v. Johnson, 44 S.W.3d 284,286
(Ark. 2001) (ambulance service improvement district); Geja's Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition
Auth., 606 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (Ill. 1992) (special service area, comprised not only of the core
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impose a charge on themselves and have the government collect the
money, which the payers will then decide how to spend on themselves.
BIDs are typically formed by the owners of the property that comprise
its territory filing a petition with the city council for approval. 4 ° They are
also created by direct city council action, but opportunity for owner
protest 4 l ensures that BIDs will have the support of a majority of the
owners in the district. Irrespective of statutory procedural requirements,
BIDs are rarely, if ever, formed over the objection of a majority of the
property owners. 142 Once established, owners of the property within the
BID usually elect their own directors, who in turn are responsible for
implementing a budget and supervising the enterprise. Though state law
again shows wide variation in the scope ofregulatory powers they exercise
and services they provide, BIDs are generally authorized to provide a fairly
wide range of common services and infrastructure. 14 1 While their revenue

downtown area, but also all those thought to benefit from the huge government investment in the
renovation of Chicago's McCormick Place convention facility); Village of Lake Barrington v.
Hogan, 649 N.E.2d 1366, 1371 (II1. App. Ct. 1995) (special service area in Lake Barrington
Industrial Park); Spradlin v. City of Fulton, 924 S.W.2d 259, 261-62 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)
("neighborhood improvement district" consisting of a proposed golf course owned by a single
entity).
140. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 P.2d at 812 (mandating that a petition to
organize a special district must be submitted for approval by both a local governing body and the
district court); Iverson v. City of North Platte, 500 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Neb. 1993) ("Under the
petition method, a street improvement district be created if the owners of three-fourths of the
property fronting the street petition for such improvement."); City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing For
Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39, 41 (Wash. 1990) (en banc) (stating that city may establish a business
improvement area "after a petition is submitted by the businesses responsible for 60% of the
assessments within the area").
141. See, e.g., Evans, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602 (stating that while the City Council is authorized
to establish a BID, the BID may not be established ifthe City Council receives written protest from
businesses that would account for the majority of proposed charges); Serenko v. City ofWilton, 593
N.W.2d 368, 371 (N.D. 1999) (finding the City Commission authorized to establish an
improvement district, but the project may not proceed if a majority of property owners in the district
file written protest within thirty days); Pappas v. Richfield City, 962 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Utah 1998)
(stating that while the City is authorized to create a service improvement district, statutes require
the governing body to abandon the district if protests are filed comprising one half of the front
footage to be assessed).
142. See Richard Briffault, A Governmentfor our Time? Business Improvement Districtsand
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 378 (1999).
143. For instance, New York statutes authorize legislative bodies to make physical
improvements to enhance the business climate in BIDs and to provide enhanced security and
sanitation services. See N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 980-C (McKinney 2003). The Grand Central BID
was authorized to construct improvements that included "the renovation of sidewalks and
crosswalks; the planting of trees; the installation of new lighting, street signs, bus shelters, news
kiosks, and trash receptacles; contributions to the renovation of Grand Central Terminal; and 'the
creation of a restaurant ... ' See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 95 (2d
Cir. 1998). The BID was also authorized to provide "'any services required for the enjoyment and
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raising powers may fit within well-established categories of local
taxation'44 or dues techniques, in some cases the lines are so blurred as to
make categorization difficult.'45 Though BIDs are used by a large number
of municipalities and their popularity appears to be growing,' 46 the case
law contains only a handful of reported judicial decisions regarding BIDs.
In most of the cases,'47 the courts upheld the legality of the BID, rejecting
challenges based on the one person, one vote doctrine, 4 ' uniformity of
taxation,'4 9 the Takings Clause, 5 ' the
52 Equal Protection Clause,"' and a
variety of state statutory arguments. 1
As both Judge Jack Weinstein and Professor Richard Briffault have
observed, BIDs pose a number of difficult questions about accountability,
equality, and fairness in local government.'53 For one thing, the typical BID
structure does not correspond to one person, one vote principles. As a
result, it creates the potential for unchecked intra-BID disparity in
treatment and runs counter to well-established notions about democratic

protection of the public,"' including "security[,] ... sanitation[,] ... special maintenance and
repair[,] ... public events[,] ... [and] retail improvements." Id.
144. See, e.g., Grais v. City of Chicago, 601 N.E.2d 745, 755 (Ill. 1992); Jarvill v. City of
Eugene, 613 P.2d I (Or. 1980) (en banc). The courts in both cases rejected uniformity challenges,
concluding that the districts were based on reasonable classifications.
145. See, e.g., Evans, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 & n.6 (finding that BID assessment is "not a true
special assessment" despite its legislative designation, "in light of the realities underlying its
adoption and the probable object and effect... to avoid the sweep of Proposition 13"); see also
Kessler, 158 F.3d at 94. (recognizing that because only nonexempt properties were assessed for the
BID, the assessment was much more like a tax). Professor Briffault has described the ways BIDs
combine elements of the financing technique of the special assessment and the physicality of a
special district's territory. See Briffault, supra note 142, at 414-20.
146. See Briffault, supra note 142, at 366-67, for a description of how BIDs are used.
147. Cf Downtown Rutland Special Tax Challengers v. City of Rutland, 617 A.2d 129, 131
(Vt. 1992) (invalidating only one of the redevelopment authority's special assessments because of
procedural deficiencies).
148. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 97-100; Grais, 601 N.E.2d at 754; 2nd Roc-Jersey Assocs. v.
Town of Morristown, 731 A.2d 1, 9-10 (N.J. 1999); Jarvill, 613 P.2d at 14-15.
149. See 2ndRoc-JerseyAssocs., 731 A.2d at 5-10.
150. See id. at 11-12.
151. See City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing For Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39,49-51 (Wash. 1990).
152. See Grais, 601 N.E.2d at 756-58 (rejecting statutory challenges alleging map and notice
deficiencies); Rogers ClothingForMen, Inc., 787 P.2d at 43-46 (rejecting an argument that the city
exceeded its authority granted by the enabling statute and a challenge based on the statutory
requirement that property be benefitted to be subject to special assessment). But see Bellevue Plaza,
Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 851 P.2d 662, 673 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting an assessment based
on a statutory provision that calls for nullification of an assessment adopted on a "fundamentally
wrong basis" and another provision requiring that all properties within an LID be assessed the same
percentage of the special benefits they receive).
153. See Kessler, 153 F.3d at 128-32 (Weinstein, J., dissenting); see also Briffault, supranote
142, at 373.
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' Moreover, its very existence establishes
representation at the local level. 54
unequal levels of service across the municipality; only those who are
willing to pay extra are entitled to the "supplemental""' services that BIDs
provide. BID supporters note that the results are instrumental in the revival
of urban business areas, that BIDs may in some ways stem the exodus of
downtown businesses to suburban locations,'5 6 and that the overall
percentage of local revenues BIDs control is still very small.'57
Nevertheless, the broader systemic implications of the phenomenon are
troubling. First, BIDs' use of special assessments has helped to cement the
complete transformation of the special assessment itself.Released from the
longstanding limitations described in the previous Part, 5 ' the BID funds
services for developed property in established areas;' frequently levies
assessments by using the ad valorem property tax method; 161 is selfadministered; 16' and has shifted its goal away from major infrastructure
construction to a more general enhancement of the neighborhood's
ambiance.162 By contributing to the erosion of traditional limits on special
assessments, BIDs have facilitated local government implementation of the
because
dues mentality. In fact, residents find BIDs attractive precisely
163
"every penny collected for the BID goes back into the BID."",

154. See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 121-31 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Judge Weinstein noted that
while the BID provided a wide range of governmental services affecting the residents in the BID,
the voting scheme excluded most residents from meaningful participation in the GCDMA. Id.
Criticizing the scheme's exclusion of non-property owners, Judge Weinstein added that "[tihe
possibility that property owners may contribute more to the municipal coffers than tenants does not
entitle the property owners to a greater electoral voice in the governance of the district which
directly affects the lives of so many residents." Id. at 127.
155. Problems with intra-local inequality are especially likely to arise, or be perceived, when
BID funds are used to enhance services already provided by the municipality. It may be difficult
to determine whether BIDs affect the level of services funded from the general budget, but cities
"may be able to stretch scarce resources by quietly cutting back on trash pickups or street cleaning
in an area if it knows that a BID exists to pick up the slack." Briffault, supra note 142, at 400-01.
In other cases, districts may receive enhanced service above that actually paid for by the BID. Id.
at 401.
156. See id. at 465; see also id. at 425-29 (discussing the "effort of urban downtowns to meet
the challenge posed by their great nemesis-the suburban shopping mall").
157. BIDs are considered self-financing-i.e., they usually rely on assessments imposed on
property or businesses in the district. Id at 391-92. Generally, assessments range less than 10% of
local property taxes. Id. at 390. Some BIDs receive appropriations from their city or county's
general government funds, which typically amounts to less than 10% of the BID's revenue,
although some districts receive more. Id. at 392.
158. See discussion supra Part II.D. 1.
159. See Briffault, supra note 142, at 369.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 372.
162. See id. at 421-22, 424.
163. See id. at 370 & n.12 (quoting a prominent BID supporter).
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Second, by imposing on downtown the costs of its own rejuvenation
and revival, BIDs exempt other segments of the community from
participation in this important project with its widespread community
benefits. Presumably, all residents and all nonresident visitors benefit from
the presence of a more vibrant, attractive, and safe central business district.
The quid pro quo underlying the BID's creation, however, implies that
both the responsibility for downtown decline and the benefits of its
elimination can be narrowly tied to one small subset of the community.
Somewhat perversely, then, the BID releases from responsibility many
others who have benefitted from downtown decay and the broader
community that would benefit from its revitalization. Finally, BIDs may
have a significant anti-regional impact on the distribution of resources
across the metropolitan areas. By capturing revenues at a sub-local level
for sub-local purposes, they exclude funds from the broader revenue
distribution process. It is not apparent that any level above the sub-local
BID territory would ever choose to distribute government revenues by
singling out the BID properties for special treatment. That debate will
never occur, however, so long as sub-local districts can use government
power to charge themselves and use the money to improve their own areas.
Those who champion regionalization should consider whether the
subdivision of general purpose governments into ever more narrowly
drawn districts can be consistent with their calls for more equitable
distribution of metropolitan area wealth.
3. User Fees and Regulatory Fees
Fees have long been a part of local government finance.'" As a general
matter, they fall into two categories: user fees or regulatory fees.'65 User
fees consist of charges levied by the government in exchange for citizen
use of government services or property.' Regulatory fees, which include
licensing and inspection fees, are based more broadly on the government's
police powers and are imposed on a regulated individual, entity, property,
or business in order to offset the cost of the regulation.167 As is the case for

164. See, e.g., Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 169 (1928) (describing limits of
local license and inspection fees); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610,619 (1915) (describing fees
imposed for registering automobiles); City of Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U.S. 430, 432-33 (1879)
(discussing fees for use of an improved wharf).
165. A third category of fees, commonly known as "impact fees," is included in the later
discussion of development exactions. See discussion infra Part II.D.4.
166. See Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confusion, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 354
(2002-2003).
167. See id. at 353-54. Regulatory fees seem to have originated with the concept of licensing
and inspection fees. In Sprout, 277 U.S. at 169, the Court described how licensing fees are based
on the government's regulatory powers as an appropriate means of "insuring the public safety and
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the other dues techniques described in this Part, the breadth and frequency
of local fees have increased substantially since their early days. From
typical nineteenth-century user fees for publicly owned facilities 16 and
licensing fees for the privilege of operating a business within city
borders, 169 the parameters have expanded enormously. Recently, user fees
have been extended to levy charges for the residential use of local streets 7°
or fire and flood protection.' 71 Similarly, regulatory fees have been
imposed on an increasing number of activities-for example, on apartment
owners to fund a rent control mediation system'72 and on paint producers
to promote a broad governmental effort to treat and prevent lead
poisoning. 73
The classification of fees is more than an academic exercise. For one
thing, some single purpose local government units have no taxing power
and are only authorized to raise revenue through fees. 74 In other contexts,
the distinction between fees and taxes is crucial because the local
government's taxation power is strictly limited'75 or requires additional
layers of voter approval, 7 6 whereas fees can be imposed directly by the
local government itself. Sometimes the state taxation principle of
uniformity is key: though a particular charge would be invalid as a nonuniform tax, the fee label makes uniformity irrelevant. 77 Other
times-whether for purposes of determining the scope of another entity's

convenience," so long as the fee is "no larger in amount than is reasonably required to defray the
expense of administering the regulations." Inspection fees similarly emanate from the state's police
power and can be imposed "to defray the expense incident to the inspection." Id.
168. See, e.g., Hatch v. Pendergast, 15 Md. 251, 259 (1860) (fee for use of a stall in the public
market); Macdonell v. Int'l & G. N. Ry. Co., 60 Tex. 590, 593 (1884) (fee for use of a city-owned
ferry and landing).
169. See Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 420, 424 (1837) (fee to maintain a bridge across the Charles River).
170. See, e.g., Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 304-05 (Colo. 1989). But see
Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
171. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 8-13-13 (2003) (authorizing local imposition of use fees for
"any essential or special municipal service"); Dean v. Town of Addison, 534 S.E.2d 403, 405 (W.
Va. 2000); City of Clarksburg v. Grandeotto, Inc., 513 S.E.2d 177, 182 (W. Va. 1998); City of
Huntington v. Bacon, 473 S.E.2d 743, 747 (W. Va. 1996).
172. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 721 P.2d 1111, 1118 n.10 (Cal. 1986) (en banc).
173. Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1351 (Cal. 1997).
174. See, e.g., Creedmor Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Barton Springs-Edwards Aquifer
Conservation Dist., 784 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
175. In Washington, for instance, property taxes may not exceed one percent of the property's
value. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
176. See, e.g., Kern County Farm Bureau v. County of Kern, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910;914, 917
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding local landfill charges as legitimate fees and thus exempt from
Proposition 13's requirement that all "'special taxes' be approved by a two-thirds vote of the
electors).
177. See, e.g., Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 326 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
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exemption from the charge,' 78 or for determining the applicability of
federal statutes' 7 -the distinction is also crucial.' For all of these issues,
the breadth of judicial interpretation of fees will have a profound impact
on the extent to which a local government can continue to raise revenue in
the face of strict external restrictions on its taxation powers.18 '
As a legal matter, courts have traditionally identified three requirements
for valid fees. First, the party being charged must benefit from the
governmental service being funded or the regulatory program being
implemented.8 2 Second, fees are voluntary.8 a And third, the charges must
correspond to the cost of the governmental activity being funded rather
than reflect a general government desire to raise revenue.' Although each
of these criteria has been expanded, rejected, or restricted by some state

178. See, e.g., United States v. City of Huntington, 999 F.2d 71, 74 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding
that municipal service fee constitutes a tax for purposes of determining federal government's tax
exempt status). Tax exempt entities must pay valid fees. See, e.g., City of Clarksburg v. Grandeotto,
Inc., 513 S.E.2d 177, 180, 181 (W. Va. 1998) (holding that tax exempt religious use required to pay
municipal fee).
179. See, e.g., Folio v. City of Clarksburg, 134 F.3d 1211, 1214-17 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that local fee for municipal services constitutes a tax for purposes of federal Tax Injunction Act,
thus barring federal court jurisdiction over the challenge); cf San Juan Cellular Tel. Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 967 F.2d 683, 684-85 (1st Cir. 1992) (deeming a 3% periodic charge on gross
revenue a fee, thus exempting it from federal Butler Act, a statute similar to the Tax Injunction Act).
180. Much less frequently, the distinction between fees and special assessments will be
dispositive. For instance, in some state statutory schemes, government property is exempt from
taxes and special assessments, but subject to fees. See Town of Winthrop v. Winthrop Hous. Auth.,
541 N.E.2d 582, 583 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (applying MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 121B § 16 (1989)).
181. Sometimes even more definitional splicing is required than a simple fee-versus-tax
distinction. In other words, state law may only apply to some kinds of fees. For instance,
California's recently adopted Proposition 218 requires voter approval of any fee, defined as "any
levy... imposed.., as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a
property-related service." CAL. CONST. art. XIIID, § 2(e). In Apartment Ass'n of Los Angeles
County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 14 P.3d 930, 933-35 (Cal. 2001), the court held that a fee on
residential rental property, adopted to fund a program for removal of substandard housing, was not
subject to the voter requirement. The court concluded that the fee was not imposed on the property
owner as an incident of property ownership, but rather on the property owner as a participant in the
business of rental housing. Id. at 935.
Similarly, the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution requires voter approval of a
levy or increase in "any tax, license or fees," Mo. CONST. art. X, § 22. In Keller v. Marion County
Ambulance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Mo. 1991), the court announced that not all fees are "fees"
for purposes of the Hancock Amendment. Thus, Missouri courts must apply the Keller test to
determine which fees are exempt from the scope of the voter approval requirement. Id. at 304 n. 10.
For a description of the courts' attempts to apply that test, see generally Joanne L. Graham,
Comment, Toward a Workable Definition of "Tax, License or Fees": Local Governments in
Missouri and the Hancock Amendment, 62 UMKC L. REV. 821 (1994).
182. See, e.g., Emerson Coll. v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Mass. 1984).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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court opinions, in their totality they outline the general parameters within
which fees are analyzed by state judiciaries.8 5
Although the benefit criterion is remarkably similar to one of the
requirements typically used in the judicial analysis of special assessments,
the breadth of the government activity to which it applies creates an even
larger potential scope in the context of fees.1 1 6 If fees may be levied to
recoup the cost of a government service or to pay for the implementation
of a governniental regulatory program, it is not clear that much local
government activity falls beyond the reach of fees. After all, what does
local government do besides provide services and regulate activity?
Moreover, because the range of permissible local government regulation
has increased substantially with the abolition of Dillon's Rule' 87 and the
narrow limits it imposed on local government activity, the potential targets
of government fees are further increased. 8

185. See generally 16 MCQUIHLAN, supra note 22, § 44.62.20.
186. In fact, in at least one state, the court interpreted applicable state statutes as requiring only
a general benefit for local fees; the local police power was deemed broad enough to uphold the
imposition of fees without a showing of special benefit. See Morse v. Wise, 226 P.2d 214, 216
(Wash. 195 1) (upholding fee for sewer system, even though the complaining fee-payers established
that the sewer system would benefit only new users, because court concluded that no benefit was
legally required); accord Teter v. Clark County, 704 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Wash. 1985) (en bane).
187. Dillon's Rule, articulated in the late nineteenth century by Chief Justice John F. Dillon
of the Iowa Supreme Court, provides:
[A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and
no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily implied
or necessarily incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those absolutely
essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not simply
convenient, but indispensable; fourth, any fair doubt as to the existence of a power
is resolved by the courts against the corporation-against the existence of the
power.
Merriam v. Moody's Ex'r, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868). Under the Rule, state courts have held, for
example, that cities have no authority to adopt ordinances not "necessarily related" or "reasonably
necessary" to effectuate the purpose of state enabling statutes. See, e.g., Early Estates, Inc. v. Hous.
Bd. of Review, 174 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1961) (invalidating an ordinance requiring installation of
hot water in all kitchens and bathrooms under a state law authorizing the city to adopt an ordinance
for minimum standards for dwellings); Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 712-13 (Va.
2000) (invalidating a city's action extending coverage under its self-funded health insurance plan
to unmarried domestic partners of employees, despite specific authorization by the General
Assembly for a local government to provide health benefit programs).
188. See, e.g., Creedmor Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Barton Springs-Edwards Aquifer
Conservation Dist., 784 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (finding special district has statutory
authority to "'provide for the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of
waste of the underground water... [and] to control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water"'
(quoting TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.021 (Vernon 1989) (repealed 1995))).
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As applied to user fees, the benefit criterion is fairly straightforward,
though capable of the same broad interpretation it has received in the
courts' special assessments analyses. Any challenge to a user fee's benefit
will depend on whether the government can show either that the fee payer
directly uses the services being funded by the fee or that the government
service or product enhances the fee-payer's ability to enjoy a higher
standard or quality of service within the community. 9 As the benefits
become more generalized and less direct, courts become less willing to
uphold the fees. 90 With regulatory fees, however, the analysis becomes a
bit more complicated. In many cases, the government will impose a
regulatory fee in order to recoup the benefit the fee payer derives from
governmental regulation, like when an owner pays a fee for participation
in the development's permit approval process. In other cases, though, the
fee is imposed not to recoup the value of a government granted benefit, but
to offset the burden imposed by the activity subject to the fee. 9 ' In that
case, the fee will be upheld if it is levied in "reasonable relationship to the
social or economic 'burdens' that [the fee-payer's] operations
generated."' 92 Thus, at least in the context of regulatory fees, the
relationship between fee and fee-payer has been expanded well beyond its
original requirement that the fee-payer receive a direct benefit from the
operation funded by the fee. "[A] causal connection or nexus,"' 9 3 however,
is still required.'94
189. See, for example, Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. BoardofSupervisors, 272 Cal. Rptr. 19,20,
25-26 (Ct. App. 1990), where the court ordered the trial court to reconsider a 9% off-airport car
rental fee, which had been assessed on all rentals made by off-airport firms to airport customers.
The fee would be valid, the court concluded, if the lower court determined that the fee constituted
a "'fair and reasonable' approximation of the overall commercial benefit each [rental company]
derives from its exploitation of the presence of the Airport." For a similarly broad definition of
benefit, see Helmerick Drive-It-Yourself Inc. v. Erie MunicipalAirport Authority, 612 A.2d 562,
565 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
190. See, e.g., Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 23 P.3d 477,485 (Wash. 2001) (en banc)
(stating that if there is no "'direct relationship"' between the fee charged and either a service
received by fee-payers or a burden to which they contribute, then "the charge is probably a tax in
fee's clothing"); see also State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Fla. 1994) (invalidating
a user fee to finance local roads where the ordinance did not require that roads be in close proximity
to property charged or provide a special benefit different from that provided to the community as
a whole); Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Mich. 1998) ("Lack of correspondence
between the charges and the benefit conferred demonstrates that the city has failed to differentiate
any particularized benefits to property owners from the general benefits conferred on the public.").
191. See cases cited supra note 40.
192. See Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1355 (Cal. 1997).
193. Id. at 1356.
194. If a service is designed to benefit society generally, fees cannot be used to recoup the cost
of the regulatory program. See, e.g., State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 745 (Haw. 1999)
(invalidating service fee to cover cost of prosecution, noting that the public at large is the primary
beneficiary of the justice system); Samis Land Co., 23 P.3d at 485-87 (invalidating standby sewer
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Voluntariness, the second fee criterion, reflects the origin of
government fees as payments by those who willingly consumed or used
services or products provided by the government. Though some courts
have tried to massage the voluntariness standard as applied to regulatory
fees, concluding that the payer has voluntarily undertaken the activity
being assessed by the fee, the definition is stretched to its logical limits
when the court concludes that a fee is voluntary because the individual
complainant can avoid the fee by ceasing to engage in the activity being
assessed.' 95 By that reasoning, many taxes are likewise voluntary-to avoid
income taxes, a taxpayer need only stop earning income. Other courts have
simply abandoned the voluntariness criterion, noting how it has gradually
faded from the judicial analysis and recognizing the relentless increase of
mandatory user fees across the country. 9 6 For some courts, though, the
voluntariness criterion remains an important mechanism for restricting
governmental enthusiasm for fees.'9 7
The third criterion requires courts to determine whether the primary
purpose of the challenged charge is to raise revenue, therefore invalidating
the fee as an impermissible tax.198 In contrast, if the charge is limited to
recovering the cost of the government activity for which it is levied, the fee
is proper. 99 As with the other criteria, the distinction is by no means clear
cut. All fees raise revenue; in fact, local governments strapped for cash
frequently adopt fees to fund projects or provide services that were
previously paid for by tax revenues. One North Carolina case, for instance,
described how the city hired an accounting firm to identify the cost of
regulatory services and to recommend possible fees, presumably to shift
the revenue source from tax to fee. 2" As a result of the study, twenty-two

charge on undeveloped property because of no direct benefit to property other than general
enhancement of community services).
195. See, e.g., Kern County Farm Bureau v. County of Kern, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 916 (Ct.
App. 1993) (noting that property owners can avoid landfill charges by deciding not to use their
property for agricultural purposes, but ultimately rejecting the voluntariness criterion).
196. See, e.g., Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304, 304-05 (Colo. 1989) (en bane)
(approving mandatory transportation utility fee); Medeiros, 973 P.2d at 741-42 (summarizing the
declining importance of voluntariness in fees in many state courts); Hochstedler v. St. Joseph
County Solid Waste Mgmt. Dist., 770 N.E.2d 910,916 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (approving mandatory
recycling charge as a permissible fee); Rogers v. Oktibbeha County Bd. of Supervisors, 749 So. 2d
966, 967 (Miss. 1999) (upholding mandatory garbage disposal fee on residents who did not use
county's disposal system).
197. See Bloom, 784 P.2d at 313 (Lohr, J., dissenting) ("The voluntariness distinction between
taxes and fees remains relevant when determining whether a charge must meet additional
requirements of a tax that do not apply to fees, such as the uniformity requirement."); Bolt v. City
of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 272 (Mich. 1998).
198. See Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 327 (Wash. 1995) (en banc).
199. Id.
200. Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 47-48 (N.C.
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new fees were imposed, for instance, a driveway permit review fee and an
erosion control review fee. 2° Though the court upheld the fees,2" 2 other
courts have been less approving of fees that they characterize as blatant
attempts to generate revenue in the face of anti-tax limitations.0 3
Though many courts have more or less refused to restrain local
government fee practices, some have identified workable criteria that are
based, implicitly if not explicitly, on the requirement that fees cannot be
adopted for the purpose of raising revenue. In fact, several principled
objective indicators appear in the case law. First, the revenues derived from
fees cannot greatly exceed the costs incurred for the provision of the
service or implementation of the regulation; the fee must constitute "a fair
and reasonable approximation of the benefit.""'' It is the value of the
service rendered, and not the value of the benefit to the fee payer, that must
be used in the computation of the fee.205 On that basis, a New Jersey court
invalidated a sheriff s execution levy fee that imposed a $275,000 cost for
ten hours of service provided during a foreclosure sale.' ° The second
objective limit, borrowed perhaps from judicially created definitions of
special assessments, requires local governments to carefully segregate fee
revenues20 7 and spend the proceeds solely on the endeavor assessed for the
fee.20 ' Finally, courts may invalidate user fees if the method of calculating
the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the fee-payer's use of the
government service or property." 9 In their totality, these criteria provide at
least some objective principles for limiting the ways a local government
can use its fee-raising powers.
Undoubtedly, the proliferation of fees is in large part motivated by local
governments' perceived need to generate revenue in the face of strict
taxation limits. The judicial response to that reality is by no means
uniform. Some courts have strictly construed the anti-tax measures,
1994).
201. Id.
202. Id.at 47.
203. See Bolt, 587 N.W.2d at 269 (invalidating a fee not structured to defray costs of a
regulatory activity, but to fund a long-term public improvement designed to benefit the city and all
citizens; noting that the Headlee Amendment arose from the spirit of the tax revolt to place
limitations on local revenues).
204. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 272 Cal. Rptr. 19, 23 (Ct. App. 1990).
205. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lanzaro, 658 A.2d 282, 284, 290 (N.J. 1995).
206. See id Butsee President Riverboat Casino, Inc. v. Mo. Gaming Comm'n, 13 S.W.3d 63 5,
637-38, 642 (Mo. 2000) (approving a casino admissions fee that exceeded cost of investigating the
licensee by a ratio of three to one as a permissible tax).
207. See, e.g., City of Huntington v. Bacon, 473 S.E.2d 743, 753 (W. Va. 1996).
208. See, e.g., Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163,169-70 (1928) (invalidating a local
license fee because its proceeds were not applied to pay the costs of the regulation and because the
amount exceeded the cost of the license program).
209. See id. at 171.
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resulting in generous and deferential interpretations of attempts to raise
local revenue. In this approach, the courts appear sympathetic to the
government's plight and supportive of the perceived importance of the
governmental purposes being funded by the revenues."' For other courts,
the underlying tax evasion motive is seen as a somewhat disingenuous
governmental practice-an end run around clearly articulated anti-tax
sentiments. The result is a heightened judicial scrutiny and invalidation of
many attempts to levy non-tax fees."' Though judicial attitudes
undoubtedly have a substantial impact on shaping the course of local
finance, the two judicial approaches described above may be counterproductive and produce unintended responses.
On the one hand, extensive judicial deference to local governments'
attempts to raise revenues in the face of strict anti-tax limits may merely
provoke additional anti-tax measures in response. The result may be an
ongoing battle between the judiciary and the voters. The California
experience is a good example. The California courts' narrow interpretation
of the voters' anti-tax initiatives has encouraged at least two further antitax limitations.22

210. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Farrell, 648 P.2d 935, 937-38 (Cal. 1982)
(declaring that the tax limitations contained in Proposition 13 should be strictly construed "so as
to limit the measures to which the two-thirds [voter approval] requirement applies"). One lower
California court, commenting on the strict judicial approach, explained that the state's anti-tax
initiatives were intended only to safeguard the voters themselves from taxes. Cal. Bldg. Indus.
Ass'n v. Governing Bd., 253 Cal. Rptr. 497, 511 (Ct. App. 1988). Thus, the courts should be more
willing to uphold charges levied on others. Id. In that view, the anti-tax sentiment is better defined
as: anti-tax for me but pro-tax for you. Id.
211. The Supreme Courts of Michigan and Washington are two leading proponents of stricter
judicial scrutiny for local fees. See Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264, 270-72 (Mich. 1999)
(concluding that the city's storm water service fee was actually an invalid tax because the charge
was levied to pay for infrastructure, the service had previously been funded by general tax revenues,
nonpayment could result in a lien on the property, and the bill for services was mailed along with
property tax bills); Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 23 P.3d 477, 480,487 (Wash. 2001) (en
banc) (invalidating standby sewer utility charge on vacant land, concluding that benefit went to
community in general).
In contrast, other state courts have upheld fees for infrastructure. See, e.g., Smith Chapel Baptist
Church v. City of Durham, 517 S.E.2d 874,879 (N.C. 1999) (holding statute authorizes city to levy
storm water fee "solely for the establishment and maintenance of physical systems"); J.K. Constr.,
Inc. v. W. Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 519 S.E.2d 561, 563-64 (S.C. 1999) (approving fee
revenues used for capital projects not financed with bonded indebtedness). Similarly, the use of
liens has been upheld as a valid means of securing fee payments. See Teter v. Clark County, 704
P.2d 1171, 1174-75 (Wash. 1985) (en banc) (upholding as legitimate fee water utility charge
enforced through local execution of lien).
212. The history of Proposition 13 and anti-tax initiatives in California reveals an ongoing
battle between the courts and the voters, producing new rounds ofanti-tax initiatives. Most recently,
California voters, who were explicitly frustrated with the courts' unwillingness to interpret the antitax initiative broadly, adopted Proposition 218, which extended the voter approval requirement to
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On the other hand, though a heightened judicial scrutiny of fees may
produce some government reduction in revenue raising, it is equally likely
that local governments will respond by resorting to increasingly narrow
user or regulatory fee systems. That is, they may seek to satisfy the fee
requirements by adopting ever more finely tuned accounting machinations
to allocate costs and cross-subsidize among municipal departments. If, for
instance, a municipality knows that a court is likely to scrutinize the fee
structure adopted and strictly apply the requirements that no surplus
revenue be generated and that the fee be levied only to recoup the cost of
providing the service, the local government will probably be able to
reallocate costs to capture the ways in which the efforts of multiple
municipal departments can be allocated to the fee. 213 Though greater
precision may satisfy the court of the bona fides of the fee, the increased
administrative and accounting costs mayjust add to the local government's
revenue deficit. At the same time, greater precision is likely to enhance the
dues mentality that is becoming so firmly ingrained in the mind of the local
government citizen.
4. Impact Fees and Developer Exactions
In some ways, impact fees and exactions are very similar to other dues
techniques: they impose costs on property owners to offset the burden the
property imposes on the community or to exact compensation for a benefit
provided, use the money collected to provide service or infrastructure, and
confer a special benefit on the property. 1 4 In one fundamental respect,
however, exactions are quite different from other dues: they are levied as
a condition precedent to governmental approval of the development or

apply to "any levy... imposed... as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or
charge for a property related service." CAL. CONST. art. XIII D, § 2(e). In Apartment Ass 'n of Los
Angeles County, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 14 P.3d 930, 938 (Cal. 2001), the court held that a fee
on residential rental property, adopted to fund a program for removal of substandard housing, was
not within the scope of Proposition 218. The court concluded that the fee was not imposed on the
property owner "as an incident of property ownership," but on the property owner as a participant
in the business of rental housing. Id. at 932, 938. The dissent, noting that Proposition 218 was a
voter reaction to the court's strict interpretation of Proposition 13, predicted yet another voter effort
to "'stop[] politicians' end-runs."' Id.at 932 (Brown, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
promotional material indicating the rationale behind Proposition 218). For the history of
Proposition 13 and its progeny, see generally Patel, supra note 85.
213. In Mountain View Ltd. Partnershipv. City ofClifton Forge,504 S.E.2d 371,373,376-77
(Va. 1998), the court upheld a substantial increase in garbage collection fees, noting that the city
had recently assigned to its solid waste fund costs incurred by other departments in performing
duties related to solid waste management. The reallocation, of course, would produce a large
increase in the city's calculation of the cost of solid waste disposal, thus ensuring that the increased
fee correlated to the cost of the service and to the benefit received from the city. Id. at 376.
214. See ALTSHULER& GCMEz-IBARJEZ, supra note 23, at 3-5.
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redevelopment of property, rather than imposed outright on those who
undertake the activity or use the service. 15 In both cases, of course, the
economic impact on the fee-payer is the same: A sidewalk will cost the
same irrespective of whether, on the one hand, the local government issues
a special assessment for it or, on the other hand, the local government
conditions the owner's ability to develop property on her agreement to
provide it. Exactions are different, then, not because they cost more or
because they are more or less precise in their calculation than other dues
216
techniques, but because they allow the local government to "leverag[e]"
landowner contributions by conditioning development permission on the
required contribution.2" 7
As a matter of historical development, exactions are also different from
other dues, which tended to expand slowly and incrementally over many
years. 218 Exactions, in contrast, emerged suddenly in response to a marked
shift in the community consensus about growth. Dubbed the "'exaction
revolution"' by the authors of one highly acclaimed study,21 9 the mid- I970s
saw a rejection of the common wisdom that growth brought prosperity in
the form of population increase, economic development, and higher local
tax revenues.220 In its place came the anti-growth interpretation that saw
development as imposing a strain on local services and infrastructure,
rarely producing adequate revenue to offset the burden it created.221 The
attitudinal shift was accompanied by a similar rethinking of local
government financing: using tax revenue to finance the infrastructure needs
of new development could be justified only so long as the taxpaying
population as a whole benefitted from that development. With growth
newly anointed as a cost-imposing interloper, local governments sought
ways to extract from the supposed beneficiary of growth a proportionate
share of the costs and burdens that the rest of the community would suffer.
Exactions, including provision of basic subdivision specific infrastructure
(such as streets, sewers, sidewalks, and lighting), more community wide
amenities (such as schools, fire stations, and parks), and so-called "social
exactions ' 222 (such as requiring developers to produce affordable housing),

215. Id.
216. The term "leveraging" comes from Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Nollan v.
California CoastalCommission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 n.5 (1987). The federal constitutionalization
of exactions challenges is discussed in the text accompanying notes 242-75, infra.
217. See ALTSHuLER & GOMEZ-IBAREZ, supranote 23, at 3-5.
218. See id. at 8-10.
219. See id. at 8 (recognizing that the change could be seen as gradual, but concluding it was
"epochal").
220. See id. at 8-10.
221. See id. at 1-10.
222. See id. at 4. Note also that the figures detailing local governments' increasing reliance on
dues techniques do not include the enormous costs imposed on developers through exactions. See
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have become an extremely common local government response
223 to the
infrastructure crisis it attributes to unacceptably rapid growth.
Following along the lines ofthe other dues analyses described in earlier
Parts, state courts have developed analogous inquiries to evaluate the
legitimacy of exactions and impact fees. Just like other dues, municipal
exactions may be stricken for lack of state enabling authority 224 or as
impermissible local taxes.225 Assuming local authority, state judiciaries
developed similar tests for evaluating the connection between the exaction
imposed and the burden caused by the development that the exaction was
intended to offset; the Supreme Court's review of state court exaction
cases identified three prevalent judicial tests. 26 For one group of courts,
the relationship had to meet the highly precise "specifically and uniquely
attributable" standard. 2 7 A second, more moderate level of scrutiny is
reflected in the 'reasonable relationship"' standard: 228 the courts inquired
whether the exaction imposed was reasonably related to the impact of the
proposed development.2 29 For a third group of state courts, no precise
standard was articulated; exactions were upheld on the basis of generalized
statements about the connection between the exaction and the burden
created by the development. 30

supra note 58. Thus, the statistics significantly understate the total amount of infrastructure and
other public amenities that are funded by dues techniques.
223. See ALTSHuLER & GOMEz-IBA&FEz, supra note 23, at 4.
224. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. City of West Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339,350 (Iowa
2002).
225. See, e.g., Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 650 P.2d 193, 195-96 (Wash. 1982)
(en banc) (invalidating development fees that the court found were "intended to raise money rather
than regulate residential developments").
226. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1994).
227. Applying this standard, for instance, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a
municipality's requirement that the developer of a proposed 250-unit residential subdivision
dedicate nearly seven acres of land for a new school. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of
Mount Pleasant, 176 N.E.2d 799, 800-03 (Il1.1961). Because the need for the new school was not
solely attributable to his development, the exaction could not stand. Id. at 802-03. For examples of
other courts following the stringent Illinois test, see J. E. D. Associates v. Town ofAtkinson, 432
A.2d 12, 15 (N.H. 1981); Divan Builders, Inc. v. PlanningBoard, 334 A.2d 30, 40 (N.J. 1975);
McKain v. Toledo City Plan Commission, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971); Frank
Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (R.I. 1970).
228. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390.
229. For example, the Texas Supreme Court required the opponent of a park dedication
ordinance to demonstrate that there was no "reasonable connection" between the increased
population created by the development and the increased recreation needs ofthe neighborhood. See
City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 806-07 (Tex. 1984); see also
Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980); Call v. City of West Jordan,
606 P.2d 217,220 (Utah 1979); Jordan v. Village ofMenomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442,447 (Wis.
1965) (cautioning against casting "an unreasonable burden of proof upon the municipality").
230. See, e.g., Billings Prop., Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 187-88 (Mont. 1964)
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Reflecting the increasing importance ofthe U.S. Constitution's Takings
" ' to the legitimacy of land use regulation,
Clause23
in the 1980s the Supreme
Court issued two important opinions invalidating exactions imposed on
landowners as conditions to local government permission to develop. In
233
Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission32 and Dolan v. City ofTigard,
the Court federalized and constitutionalized the law of local government
exactions, announcing the double nexus test that now applies any time the
government seeks to condition development approval on developer
dedication of land. As a general prefatory matter, all exactions involve
three important elements: a government goal being furthered;2 34 a condition
imposed on the development (the exaction itself);23. and an impact on
government services and infrastructure caused by the development
proposal.236 Nollan involved the relationship between the first two, while
Dolan (and the state court tests described above) dealt with the latter two.
The resulting double
nexus test requires that the exaction have an
"essential nexus"23 with the goal for which it is adopted and that the
development's impact be "'rough[ly] proportional[]""'23 to the exaction
imposed.239

(noting that because the legislature had already made the determination that "a subdivision of this
size created the need" for parks and the "need was not merely concomitant to the natural growth
of a municipality," it was sufficient that the subdivision created the "specific need" for recreational
facilities); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673,674, 677 (N.Y. 1966) (approving
a developer exaction because "the village acted within its rights in collecting these moneys from
plaintiff').
231. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
232. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
233. 512 U.S. at 374.
234. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
235. Id.at 837; Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
236. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
237. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37 (An exaction is permissible "[i]f a prohibition designed
to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking;"
however, "the lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was.")
238. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 ("'[R]ough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold
to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but
the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."). The Court explicitly
concluded that, under its analysis, only the third, most lax group of states failed to meet the "rough
proportionality" standard. Id. at 389.
239. Applying these standards, the Nollan Court invalidated a California Coastal
Commission's requirement that the Nollans grant the public a lateral easement along their
beachfront because it determined that the exaction (lateral access) did not bear an essential nexus
to the public goal (preserving visual access). Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. In Dolan, the city had
conditioned the landowner's ability to double the density of commercial development on her land
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In addition to establishing the applicability of its new federal standards
to landowner exactions challenges, the Nollan-Dolanopinions suggested
several other important changes to the contours of judicial review of
exactions. In particular, the Court appeared to impose the burden of proof
on the city, provoking dissents that hearkened back to well-established land
use principles of deference to the legislature and the general rule that the
individual challenger bore the burden of establishing the illegality of the
land use regulation.240 Along similar lines, the majority's heightened
scrutiny of the relationship between the government's goal and the means
adopted struck some Justices as a thinly veiled and misguided attempt to
revive heightened substantive due process review in the guise of takings
analysis.24 ' More generally, the Court's characterization of the exactions
'
imposed as a "girmnick[],"242 or a mere "recreational easement"243
suggested an underlying distrust of government, rather than a desire to
ensure that the cost of the exactions be spread across the community.244
The Nollan-Dolan pair has generated much scholarly debate, analysis,
and predictions of the future course of the Court's exactions doctrine,245 as
and pave a gravel parking lot on her willingness to comply with two separate exactions
requirements: to dedicate an easement to land lying within the flood plain and to dedicate an
easement to land adjacent to the flood plain for use as a public pedestrian and bicycle pathway.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 378-81. The first easement was intended to allow municipal improvement of a
storm drainage system along the creek; the second reflected the city's judgment that, because the
new development would generate an additional 435 vehicle trips per day, contribution to the
bikeway path system would be a reasonable mitigation of that increased congestion. Id. Although
the city had based these exactions on its formally adopted Comprehensive Plan, Master Drainage
Plan, and carefully documented transportation studies, the Court concluded that the exactions did
not stand in "rough proportionality" to the impact Ms. Dolan's redevelopment would impose on
the central city. Id.at 391, 396.
240. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 413-14 (Souter, J., dissenting); id.at4lI (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 410 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for its "application of what is
essentially the doctrine of substantive due process" and for confusing "the past with the present").
242. See id. at 387 (describing the Commission's behavior as "trying to obtain an easement
through gimmickry").
243. Id. at 394.
244. Justice Thomas has expressed similar sentiments about local land regulation. In Parking
Ass 'n of Georgia,Inc. v. City ofAtlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200,201-02 (Ga. 1994), the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld an Atlanta ordinance that imposed restrictions on developers of parking lots. In his
dissent from the landowner's petition for certiorari, which alleged a Nollan-Dolan taking, Justice
Thomas dismissively referred to the local law as "[m]otivated by a desire to improve the
attractiveness of its downtown region," ignoring the record's description of the ordinance as an
attempt to reduce the flooding caused by paving and the ways unshaded pavements contribute to
increased atmospheric temperatures. Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116,
1116 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245. The implications of Nollan-Dolan for the Takings Clause analysis, in general, and for
local land use regulation, specifically, are beyond the scope of this Article. The scholarly debate
is wide-ranging. See generally, e.g., Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the UnconstitutionalConditionsDoctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473 (1991); Abraham
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well as numerous judicial opinions applying its rules and expressing
uncertainty about its scope.246 For purposes of this Article, however, the
key questions have to do with the applicability of the double nexus test to
other dues techniques, and the impact heightened federal scrutiny will have
on local government finance more broadly. The key passages for these
issues are found, first, in the Nollan Court's characterization of the object
of its new takings test: "We are inclined to be particularly careful...
where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition to the lifting
of a land-use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk that
the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the
stated police-power objective. 247 Second, in Dolan,the Court stressed that
the heightened review was especially appropriate when the exactions
decision was not the product of a "legislative determination[], 248 but a
particularized "adjudicative decision to condition [the landowner's]
application...
[on the] requirement that she deed portions of the property
'
to the city. 249
Applying those observations to the parameters of local government
financing techniques suggests three relevant questions for the future of
local government finance. First, does the Court intend to limit the analysis
to cases of required landowner dedication of property rights or will the
analysis apply more broadly to other exactions like impact fees? Second,
is the Nollan-Dolan test limited to costs imposed on landowners as a
condition to government permit approval or does it apply generally to other
government imposed costs and limitations on property's developability?
Third, is the double nexus limited to judicial review of individualized
"adjudicative" decisions or does it extend to evaluate the impact of broad,
legislatively adopted exactions?
Though the Court has not had the occasion to address these questions
directly, some inklings can be gleaned from other cases and from lower-

Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001); David L. Callies, Regulatory
Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives on PropertyRights Have Changedfrom Penn
Central to Dolan, and What State and Federal Courts are DoingAbout It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523
(1999); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV.
1243 (1997) (discussing the ways judicial scrutiny of development exactions may impede efficient
economic allocation in land development markets); Lee Anne Fennell, HardBargains and Real
Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000); William Michael Treanor, The
Original Understandingof the Takings Clause and the Political Process,95 CoLuM. L. REV. 782
(1995).
246. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,451 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion)
("[T]he task of making this blitz of opinions doctrinally coherent is daunting; even the short-term
direction of the court's recent takings jurisprudence remains uncertain.").
247. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1989).
248. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
249. Id.
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court reactions to Nollan-Dolan.With regard to the applicability of the test
to fees, the Court's opinions refer consistently to exactions that require
landowner transfers of property and suggest that the test may not extend to
impact fees and other conditions imposed through the permit approval
process, such as a requirement that a landowner reserve a portion of the lot
for open space. 5 In one of the few cases to reach this issue, however, the
Supreme Court of California concluded that the distinction between
property dedication and fees was irrelevant to the underlying takings claim
and applied Nollan-Dolan to local fees for recreation and public art
" ' The court's logic was persuasive:
imposed for permission to develop.25
[I]t matters little whether the local land use permit authority
demands the actual conveyance of property or the payment of
a monetary exaction. In a context in which the constraints
imposed by legislative and political processes are absent or
substantially reduced, the risk of too elastic or diluted a
takings standard-the vice of distributive injustice in the
allocation of civic costs-is heightened in either case. 2
Other lower courts have adopted similar reasoning and applied NollanDolan to impact fees.253
The second issue, whether Nollan-Dolan should extend beyond the
context of conditions, finds more direct Supreme Court guidance. In fact,
in a recent decision, the Court declined to extend the test beyond the
context of exactions imposed in exchange for government development
approval. In City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,254
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion emphasized that the Nollan-Dolantest

250. See City of Annapolis v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1018-19 (Md. 2000) (concluding
that Nollan-Dolan is inapplicable to government's conditioning development approval on
landowner's agreement to leave one of four lots undeveloped for the open space enjoyment of the
residents of the dwellings to be built on the other three lots).
251. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 444.
252. Id.
253. See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 134 (Fla. 2000)
(finding that the dual rational nexus test is not limited to the water and sewer line context); St.
Johns County v. N.E. Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1991) (applying the dual
rational nexus test to impact fees on new residential construction to be used for new school
facilities); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(applying the Nollan-Dollantest to fees and holding that legislative formulae are not sufficient in
absence of an particularized assessment). But see Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 829 P.2d 765, 773
(Wash. 1992) (en banc) (finding Nollan-Dolantest not applicable to demolition fee for low income
housing because the exaction was not physical); Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941
F.2d 872, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding fee for construction of low income housing not subject
to Nollan).
254. 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999).
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'
should apply only to evaluate challenges to "excessive exactions."255
Kennedy's language suggests that lower state courts have properly refused
to apply the double nexus standard to other dues techniques25 6 and direct
land use regulation.257 As a matter of logic, however, requiring a developer
to construct a storm water detention system as a prerequisite to
development approval has no different effect on the landowner than
waiting until the property is developed and then assessing the owner to pay
for the same improvement.258 It is possible that whatever hesitation the
Court may have to extend the test beyond exactions has less to do with
principled lines and more to do with its reluctance to bring all local
government dues techniques within the ambit of the Federal Takings
Clause.
Finally, the Court's suggestion that the legislative-adjudicative
distinction has a bearing on the applicability of Nollan-Dolanappears to
draw another principled limit to its local government finance review. In a
recent case, for instance, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to apply the
double nexus test to a takings challenge brought by owners of surface
parking lots who objected to city wide requirements that all parking lots
provide landscaping on 10% of the lot and plant one tree for every eight
parking spaces.259 Characterizing the ordinance as a "legislative
determination," 260 because it applied across the board and was not the
product of the same individualized adjudicatory-like procedures through

255. Justice Kennedy concluded that Dolan'sstandard is not applicable to evaluate the city's
outright denial of development permission and that Dolanis properly limited to "the special context
of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of
property to public use." Id.
256. See generally, e.g., Waters Landing Ltd. P'ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712
(Md. 1994).
257. See, e.g., Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 451 (finding Nollan-Dolantest applies to fees); Krupp v.
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687,696 (Colo. 2001) (finding Nollan-Dolantest applicable
to "generally applicable, legislatively formulated" special assessment-like fees); City of Annapolis
v. Waterman, 745 A.2d 1000, 1015-19 (Md. 2000) (distinguishing a condition imposed on a
subdivision approval of a reservation, or setting aside of specified land for use by those residing
within the development, which is not subject to Dolan, from a condition requiring dedication of
land, which is subject to Dolan). But see Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 483
(N.Y. 1994) (applying Nollan-Dolanto a regulatory takings challenge to a statute that required
apartment building owners to renew leases to public hospital).
258. Though economists do not agree on who bears the cost of exactions, they appear to have
reached a consensus that the developer does not bear the cost. See Wes Clarke & Jennifer Evans,
Development Impact Fees and the Acquisition of Infrastructure,21 J. URB. AFF. 281, 287 (1999)
(finding that developers may plan for lower levels of capital investment in cities that use impact
fees); John Yinger, The Incidence of Development Fees andSpecial Assessments, 51 NAT'L TAX
J. 23, 37 (1998) ("[To the extent housing construction is competitive, [development fees] do not
place any burden on developers. No wonder development fees are so popular!").
259. See Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 202-03 (Ga. 1994).
260. Id at 203 n.3.
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which the Nollans and Ms. Dolan passed, the court concluded that the
" ' Dissenting from the
Nollan-Dolan double nexus test was inapplicable.26
denial of certiorari, however, Justices Thomas and O'Connor argued for
extending the rationale of Nollan-Dolanto takings arguments challenging
legislative or adjudicative decisions at the local level.262 Whether the Court
will ultimately apply the double nexus test to broad, straightforward
requirements and fee formulae depends on the Court's more general
assessment of land use regulation. The heightened scrutiny that underlies
the double nexus test arose because of the Court's conclusion that the
government had not engaged in a sufficiently particularized calculation of
the impact of the development proposal before it.263 In broad, legislatively
adopted fee formulae, however, there is no particularized inquiry at the
outset; in fact, the general, across the board nature of the law is what
defines it as legislative. By this logic, legislatively imposed exactions may
appear even more suspect than the individualized negotiations that
produced the exactions challenged in Nollan-Dolan.2"
For local government revenue raising techniques, the combined impact
of the definitive answers to these three questions could be substantial. If,
as Justice Thomas has urged, the distinction[s] used to limit Nollan-Dolan
' it is not
are merely "distinctions without a constitutional difference,"265
fanciful to suggest that the entire area of local government dues could be
subjected to the federalized takings standards that currently apply only to
exactions. The underlying concern about the lack of correlation between
the government imposed requirement and the extent the landowner is
responsible for the problem being solved is not limited to exactions, but
applies more broadly to government dues techniques. As a matter of logic,
exactions are not a principled stopping point for Nollan-Dolan;rather, the

261. Id at203.
262. Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("The distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative
takings appears to be a distinction without a constitutional difference."). But see Ehrlich, 911 P.2d
at 433 (finding Nollan-Dolan not applicable to generalized legislative requirements); Curtis v.
Town of South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657,660 (Me. 1998) (holding test not applicable to easement
requirement deriving from legislative rule of general applicability rather than from ad hoc
determination); Waters Landing Ltd. P'ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 1994)
(finding Nollan-Dolannot applicable to development impact fee imposed by legislative enactment
rather than adjudication).
263. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
264. But see Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966,982 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)
(concluding that Dolan's rough proportionality test was inapplicable to a traffic impact fee that
applied to a broad class of property and was calculated by use of a pre-determined formula adopted
by the local legislative body).
265. ParkingAss 'nofGa., Inc., 515 U.S. at 1118 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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test would appear to extend quite easily to special assessments, BIDs, and
a wide variety of local government fees. 26
Whether the Court ultimately extends the Nollan-Dolanrationale to the
entire range of local government dues or whether it continues to carve out
a specialized niche for evaluating exactions of property, the Court's
reliance on the Takings Clause in those cases is likely to exert a more
generalized effect on local finance practices. When viewed from the
vantage point of local government finance, the Takings Clause stands in
great tension with the premise that underlies all dues techniques. As the
Supreme Court so frequently reminds us, the purpose of the Takings
Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole. 2 67 Echoing that sentiment, Justice Scalia has stressed
that the essence of the Takings Clause is "simply the unfairness of making
one citizen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy a social
problem that is none of his creation. "26' Thus, the Takings Clause seeks to
collectivize the costs of government by shifting them to the taxing arena.
Dues, of course, exert pressure in the opposite direction. By focusing on
the benefit received by the individual payer, they push towards
individualization of the cost of government services and infrastructure.
Invalidation of a dues technique as an impermissible taking, then, should
counter that trend towards individualization and encourage government
redistribution of the cost across the entire population.
As a matter of logic, invalidation of a dues technique as a taking could
produce one ofthree government reactions: the government might abandon
the program entirely; it could transfer financing to general tax revenues; or
it could adopt ever more finely tuned dues techniques that might satisfy the
Court's heightened two-pronged test. All things being equal, and assuming
that the government is either unable or unwilling to terminate the
invalidated financing program, one would expect the government to
engage in the same dues versus taxation analysis described in earlier

266. One commentator, citing the work of Vicki Been and Carol Rose, urges that the
legislative/adjudicative distinction not be extended. Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between
Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 257
(2000). She advocates instead for a new land use exactions standard that prevents situations that
"create the potential for government overreaching," while protecting the "components of a wellfunctioning exactions process." Id.at 247. Those components include primarily "'voice,"' the
ability of all affected interests to participate fully, and "'exit," the ability ofthe landowner to leave
the municipality if dissatisfied with the result of the negotiation. Id.
267. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). The Court has since frequently cited
that passage, maintaining that justice and fairness are the animating criteria of the Takings Clause.
See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321
(2002); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978).
268. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23 (1985) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Parts.26 9 But as that discussion suggested, the weight of the current factors
exerts an overwhelmingly uni-directional, anti-tax force. Thus, when the
Court's exactions nexus test is layered over the existing anti-tax incentives,
the result is even more dues.27°
5. Dues in Tax Clothing2 7t
Notwithstanding general assertions earlier in this Article that the
primary distinction between taxes and dues rests on the legal relevance or
irrelevance of the relationship between payer and benefit,272 some local
taxes have occasionally been justified by a consideration of taxpayer
benefit. In fact, some courts have upheld the legitimacy of local taxation
devices with a dues-like rationale, further cementing the dues mentality in
local government finance and blurring the distinctions between the two
categories. The main examples of dues-like taxes are threefold. First,
typically to provide services that require capital-intensive infrastructure
expenses, local governments have turned increasingly to the creation of
narrowly defined, single purpose governments with taxing or other revenue
raising powers."' Because the special district's or public authority's
powers are limited to its central purpose, any tax levied by that entity will,
by definition, be used to fund one of the district's narrowly defined scope
of permissible operations. The more that taxpayers and courts associate
taxes with a particular project or service that they are paying for or with a
well-defined and segregated revenue stream, the greater the likelihood that
they will see taxes as a narrowly drawn quid pro quo-the "get what you
pay for" model acquires greater visibility and legitimacy.274 Thus, in a non269. See discussion supra Part II.C.
270. The authors of a recently published study have concluded, in fact, that heightened
scrutiny has led to an increase in the total amount of fees and other exactions levied in California
municipalities. See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme
Court's Takings JurisprudenceAffects Local Land Use Decisions,35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 103, 120
(2001).
271. This heading derives from Justice Maynard's dissent in City ofClarksburgv. Grandeotto,
Inc., 513 S.E.2d 177, 182 (W. Va. 1998) (Maynard, J., dissenting), where he criticized the majority
for subjecting a religious, tax-exempt land use to a "wolfish tax which is cloaked in the garb of a
sheepish fee." This Part deals with the reverse of the situation Justice Maynard criticized; benefit
taxes reflect a trend in local government finance to cloak taxes with many of the characteristics of
dues.
272. See discussion supra Part II.C.
273. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 137-49, for a discussion of the growing use of special
districts to provide local government services. See also sources cited supra note 20.
274. See, e.g., Grais v. City ofChicago, 601 N.E.2d 745, 759 (II!. 1992) (upholding imposition
of special service area property tax because of the district's projected disproportionate benefit from
improved services funded by the tax). But see Kendall v. Douglas, Grant, Lincoln & Okanogan
Counties Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 6, 820 P.2d 497, 503 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (steadfastly refusing
to consider taxpayer claims about disproportionate benefit, noting the "practical impossibility of
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trivial way, the explosive growth in special districts itself enhances the
dues mentality among the minds of the citizens who are subject to an ever
increasing number of charges from limited purpose governments.
Second, and even more corrosive to the standard principle that
taxpayers are not legally entitled to benefit from their financial
contributions to tax revenues, is the increasing use of "benefit" or "special"
taxes by general purpose local governments, where a narrowly drawn
subsection of the population is chosen to bear the tax burden for a specific
government project. Take, for example, the recent expansion of Chicago's
McCormick Place. Of the many funding sources for this huge financial
undertaking,275 challenges to at least two revenue raising techniques
reached the Illinois Supreme Court. In one, Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan
Pier & Exposition Authority,"' taxpayers challenged the way a retailer's
occupation tax classification was created with three narrowly drawn
criteria. The relatively small group of taxpayers that met all three criteria,
chosen to bear this tax burden because of the legislature's conclusion that
they were likely to benefit from the renovated facility, sued. First, the
opponents argued that the narrow geographic areas where the tax applied
did not properly distinguish benefitted taxpayers.277 Second, they
challenged the limited class of transactions to which the tax applied,
including only carryout food and beverage sales made at restaurants and
full service bars.27 Finally, the challengers asserted that the taxing
authority improperly distinguished restaurants from other retail businesses
likely to benefit from the improvements to McCormick Place. The court's
response to these classification challenges was categorical: "It is well

drawing the [taxing entity's] boundaries ...in such a way that a uniform tax rate will result in
equivalent cost/benefit ratios for all inhabitants").
275. The Metropolitan Pier and Exposition Authority Act authorized a $1 billion expansion
of McCormick Place. See Tri-State Coach Lines, Inc. v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 732
N.E.2d 1137, 1140 (111. App. Ct. 2000). The project included construction ofa new Exhibition Hall,
renovation of existing facilities, construction of a concourse connecting the facilities, and
construction of related infrastructure projects. See Geja's Cafe v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth.,
606 N.E.2d 1212, 1215 (I11.
1992). Two hundred sixty-five million dollars of the project's cost was
to be funded through the issuance of thirty-year limited tax bonds and up to $450 million would
come from state and city investment paid from 1992 World's Fair revenues. FIN. & LEGISLATIVE
TASK FORCE ON MCCORMICK PLACE ExPANSION, THE 1992 WORLD'S FAIR, STATEWIDE TOURISM,
DRAFr REPORT 1-8 (June 1984). Another $450 million was expected to be raised from private
sector investment, including bank and corporate loans and cash contributions from individuals,
corporations, and civic groups. Id.The remainder of the costs were to be met with revenues raised
by an increase in the statewide hotel/motel tax, Cook County World's Fair Tax, metropolitan
Chicago restaurant tax, horse racing tax funds, and annual Columbus Day Lotto Game proceeds.
Id.
276. 606 N.E.2d at 1214.
277. Id. at 1216.
278. Id. at 1218.
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settled that a municipality is able to limit the class of persons taxed to
project while exempting
those likely to benefit directly from a particular
2
those who will benefit only indirectly.1
In the second case, Allegro Services, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Pier &
Exposition Authority,280 plaintiffs challenged another McCormick Place
renovation tax: an airport departure tax on providers of limousine
transportation to and from O'Hare Airport. Even though a number of the
companies subject to the tax were not licensed to operate within
Chicago, 28 ' the court upheld the tax's legality,28 2 concluding that the taxing
authority had again reasonably determined that the tax applied to those
who could reasonably be expected to profit from the renovations being
funded by the tax revenues.283
Rejecting the taxpayers' uniformity challenges, the opinions in both
cases relied on the likely benefit to the taxpayers from the enhanced
business opportunities that their tax contributions made possible. Though
the court's references to taxpayer benefit contradict the well-established
wisdom about the legal irrelevancy of the relationship between taxes and
taxpayer benefits, the analysis is predictable and defensible. Given the
finely tuned and extremely narrow classes of taxpayers selected to bear the
brunt of the taxes challenged in both cases, the uniformity question came
down to whether the lines drawn between taxpayers and non-taxpayers
were reasonable. That question, in turn, depended crucially on the court's
conclusion that the taxing entity had made the rational determination that
taxpayers as a group (and in contrast to non-taxpayers) could reasonably
be expected to benefit from the renovations being funded by the tax
revenue. 2" Thus, because the reasonableness of any taxpayer classification
depends on the rationality of the lines drawn and because the lines in these
cases were drawn with the purpose of saddling those who would benefit
from the expenditure with the responsibility of funding it, the benefit to be
provided to the taxpayers became an essential determinant of the
reasonableness of the classification. Other courts have used different

279. Id. at 1218.
1996).
280. 665 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 I1l.
281. Id. at 1250.
282. Id. at 1249.
283. Id. at 1255. Similarly, in People exrel.Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242,248,249 (I11.
1980), the court upheld use of a tax increment finance district designation against a uniformity
challenge, noting that "[t]hose taxpayers who will directly benefit from redevelopment will pay
taxes to the municipality while those further removed physically from the redevelopment area will
have fewer, if any, tax revenues paid over to the municipality." Again, the court has used the
likelihood oftaxpayer benefit as the key factor supporting the challenged classification for purposes
of a very narrowly drawn tax.
284. Geja's Cafe, 606 N.E.2d at 1218; Allegro Servs., Ltd., 665 N.E.2d at 1255.
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terminology but similar reasoning, and the result is the same: taxes are
becoming more like dues.28
Finally, a third dues-like tax technique involves the redistribution of
local property taxes. Disregarding the important principle that tax revenues
are not earmarked, tax increment financing (TIF) offers local governments
a way to segregate property taxes and pledge them to pay the cost of
improvements on the property that has paid the taxes.286 This highly touted
win-win situation involves the apparent subversion of the fundamental
distinction between taxes and dues, which requires tax payments to go into
general revenue funds and makes irrelevant the relationship between
taxpayer payment and taxpayer benefit.
The rationale for TIF is quite straightforward and its implementation
ingenious."8 7 First, the government designates an area within its territory

285. See, e.g., Youngblood v. State, 388 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1990) (rejecting uniformity
challenge to hotel/motel tax because taxpayers "are businesses that will directly benefit from an
increase in tourism and the provision of local government services within the district"); Leonard
v. Thornburgh, 489 A.2d 1349, 1352 (Pa. 1985) (upholding lower income tax levy on non-residents
and noting that "non-resident wage earners utilize services... to a lesser extent than do residents").
In a series of cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that uniformity constraints
required different treatment for "special taxes," defined as taxes "imposed for the sole purpose of
funding one [government project]." Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Pa. 1985).
In Monzo, the court invalidated a narrowly targeted accommodations tax on uniformity grounds
because it did not establish a proportionality between benefit received by taxpayer and burden
imposed. Id. at 1104-05. The court noted that general taxes, described as taxes levied for "general
public use," did not impose the same benefit requirement. Id. at 1102. Later cases, though
continuing to apply the "special tax" standard, have found the required level of proportionality in
similar fact patterns. See, e.g., Bold Corp. v. County of Lancaster, 801 A.2d 469, 474 (Pa. 2002);
Torbik v. Luzeme County, 696 A.2d 1141, 1144 (Pa. 1997); Leventhal v. City of Philadelphia, 542
A.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Pa. 1988); see also Rackliffe v. Northport Vill. Corp., 711 A.2d 1282, 1284
(Me. 1998) (upholding differential tax burden between taxing districts by noting that "[i]f, however,
a town, city, or smaller district receives a special benefit from a public improvement, it may be
required to shoulder a greater tax burden as long as the burden is proportional to the benefit
received").
A recent opinion by the Supreme Court of Minnesota illustrates an interesting flip side to the
increasing application of a benefit standard in taxation classifications. In Westling v. County of
Mille Lacs, 581 N.W.2d 815, 817, 823-24 (Minn. 1998), the court rejected a uniformity challenge
to the imposition of a "'contamination tax' on real property. While the tax did not reflect the likely
benefit to be derived by the taxpayer from the tax, it logically assessed the property for the burden
likely to be imposed on the community by the presence of contaminated property, including
"increased health risks.... decreased valuations for nearby properties, and ... abandonment or
under-utilization of property, thereby contributing to community blight and economic distress.
Contaminated property thereby poses a greater burden on society than uncontaminated property."
Id. at 821.
286. Briffault, supra note 15, at 512.
287. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of TIF, see Crouch, 403 N.E.2d at 242;
and Briffault, supra note 15, at 512-14.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss2/2

56

Reynolds: Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What you Pay For" Mo
TAXES, FEES, ASSESSAIENTS. DUES

where property is blighted. 8' Once the district is established, the assessed
valuation for all property in the district is frozen for the local governments
with taxing authority over the property. The government then borrows
money to provide services, infrastructure, or general property
redevelopment in the district. As the TIF properties' value is enhanced by
the improvements, all tax revenues generated by the incremental increases
in assessment valuation are used to repay the debts incurred for the TIF
improvements. All taxing units, however, can only collect the revenues
generated by the pre-TIF value. When the TIF district expires (usually after
twenty years) and all debts are paid off, the property is presumably greatly
enhanced in value. As the improved properties come fully on line, their
new assessed value provides greater revenues for the governments that
have had to forego the increases over the TIF period.289
Whether TIFs are a reasonable way for government to stimulate
redevelopment of blighted property, or whether it is merely a clever way
to allow private owners to use government funds to improve their own
property at public expense, depends on one crucial and unknowable factor:
whether market forces would have stimulated the redevelopment in the
absence of TIF financing. TIF supporters, of course, argue that the answer
is no,"9 and that the short term deprivation of property tax revenues is
offset by the ultimate benefit produced by the presence of more valuable
property within the jurisdiction.29 ' For hard pressed local government units
like school districts, which frequently have no voice in the establishment
of a TIF district, 292 the municipality's decision that all taxing districts will
forego increased property tax revenues for a twenty-year period may create
an ephemeral benefit. After all, twenty years represents nearly two
generations of school children, and the delayed benefit may pale in
comparison to the district's perceived immediate need for revenue.
Nevertheless, state courts typically uphold TIF districts against challenges
based on uniformity and public purpose provisions.293 By invading the
province of local property tax revenues and pledging that the taxpaying
property will benefit from the payments, TIFs further erode the distinction
between taxes and dues at the local level.

288. Briffault, supra note 15, at 512.
289. Id.
290. See People ex rel. Canton v. Crouch, 403 N.E.2d 242, 244 (Ill. 1980).
291. Id. at 245-49.
292. One state court refused to allow a TIF district to capture school district revenues. See
Leonard v. City of Spokane, 897 P.2d 358,362 (Wash. 1995) (en banc). Another upheld the ability
of the legislature to force the diversion of school district property taxes. See In re Request for
Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1986 PA 281, 422 N.W.2d 186, 203 (Mich. 1988).
293. See, e.g., Delogu v. State, 720 A.2d 1153, 1154 (Me. 1998); Crouch,403 N.E.2d at 252.
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THE METROPOLITAN LANDSCAPE IN A WORLD OF DUES

Dues have enjoyed a long history as one respected component of an
overall municipal financing policy. When they constitute a modest fraction
of a much wider variety of financing techniques, they help to advance the
local government's goals in a number of ways. Dues may work to
implement a communal consensus about service levels, general community
welfare, redistribution of resources, and the appropriateness of tying
government benefits and services to the ability to pay. This Article
recognizes that dues have been and will continue to be an important source
of local revenues, as well they should be. My point is not to condemn dues
as regressive, unfair, privatizing, and exploitative of the poor, but rather to
sound caution against their overzealous use. No mathematical formula is
capable of determining whether dues, taxes, or a combination of the two
are preferable in any particular funding decision. So long as the range of
factors applicable to local government funding decisions rested
comfortably within a balancing of the six longstanding factors described
earlier in this Article,29 4 dues were likely to appear on a limited number of
finance proposals. The balance has been upset, however, with the more
recently evolving phenomena, all pro-dues in their impact. 295 Taken
together, they frequently override the delicate balancing act that existed in
prior years. It is that disproportionate weight that this Article criticizes.
The growing and increasingly exaggerated prominence of dues in local
government finance has had a significant impact, not only on the ways
municipalities operate, but also on citizens' attitudes about the role of
general purpose local governments. For instance, because of judicially
imposed requirements that the legitimacy of dues depends on a clear
correlation between the benefit received and the cost imposed, payers may
develop an unrealistic perception of precision and self sufficiency.
Moreover, because the trends suggest ever greater municipal reliance on
non-tax revenue raising and because dues are based on the consumer vision
that allocates government services on the basis of ability to pay, the
implications for fairness and equality in the provision of services are
troubling. And finally, as local governments increasingly turn to a more
regressive form of service provision, which requires computation of cost
and benefit in exchange for government charge on the citizen, they may in
fact be fomenting more general anti-tax and anti-government sentiments.
This Part addresses these unintended consequences.

294. See discussion supra Parts II.C.1-6.
295. See discussion supra Parts II.C.7-10.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss2/2

58

Reynolds: Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What you Pay For" Mo
2004]

TAXES, FEES. ASSESSMENS, DUES

A. Skewed Spending Priorities
Because the starting point for the local government's initial choice
between dues and taxes has been seriously skewed in favor of dues, 296 the
government's allocation of revenue between the two devices is likely to
reflect that imbalance. In other words, as a result of the current
preponderance of anti-tax incentives, local governments turn to dues, not
only when a reasoned policy judgment indicates that dues would most
properly reflect the community's consensus about fairness in the provision
of local government services, but as the only realistic way to raise revenue
in the face of substantial barriers to tax financing. In turn, the
disproportionately high use of dues produces a subsequent skewing of
spending priorities by influencing the government's choice of projects and
services. Since dues are more frequently and more easily used to pay for
"things" than for social services for "people," and since the government
has numerous incentives to choose dues financing over taxes, it is likely to
provide proportionally more "things" 297 than it would without the heavy
skewing.
Second, the essential dues characteristic that revenues be segregated has
the additional effect of removing dues-funded projects from the general
revenue budgeting process. Because they are not deposited into the
municipality's general revenues fund, but rather isolated and pledged to the
project for which they are levied, dues are not involved in what urban
economists call "full line forcing": the give and take of the budget debate
that sets spending priorities for local revenues. 2" As a result, in today's
typical city council chambers, there is usually no debate on whether the
municipality should spend its revenues to build a new sewer or, in the
alternative, to provide more housing opportunities for the poor. Because
of the difference in funding techniques, that debate will not take place, and
no elected official will be forced to choose between them. The sewers, if
they are built, are likely to involve strictly segregated charges and a
pledged revenue stream, untouchable and beyond the reach of local
296. See discussion supra Part II.C.
297. Former Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Henry
Cisneros, described governments' preference for "things-regionalism," while ignoring "peopleregionalism."See HENRYG. CISNEROS, REGIONALISM: THENEWGEOGRAPHYOFOPPORTUNIY 8-9

(1995). "Things-regionalism" includes "larger public works such as water and sewer facilities, flood
control and irrigation systems, regional airports, major roads and highways, and mass transit
systems." Id. at 8. "People-regionalism" refers to programs that would address the "heart of
America's 'urban problem'-the new face of poverty.... The most extreme poverty in America
is now found in geographically isolated, economically depressed, and racially segregated inner
cities and older, declining suburbs." Id. at 9; see alsoRichard Briffault, Localism andRegionalism,
48 BUFF. L. REV. 1,3-5 (2000).
298. See FOSTER, supra note 20, at 189-217, for a fuller discussion of this phenomenon. See
also Reynolds, supra note 2, at 144-45.
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government officials. What remains for the general revenue debate are
disputes over spending between, on the one hand, public goods like police
and fire services... and, on the other hand, social services.
The financial impact goes even further. It appears that the things and
services funded by dues capture a larger percentage of the total available
revenues than they would if they formed part of the local budget debate.
That is, dues are greedy" and expensive. In fact, as determined in a recent
study, local government services cost more when the provider is a single
purpose unit of government and has a segregated revenue stream than
when the multi-purpose local government provides the service with general
tax revenues."' When taken together, dues' multiple effects on the local
government budgeting process and revenue allocation are quite significant.
In many ways, in the post-1970 pro-dues world, local government
decisions about what services to provide, what programs to undertake, and
what behavior to regulate, are frequently not based on a policy decision
about the future of the community and the general citizen welfare. Instead,
these decisions are based more on a realistic assessment that the external
and internal incentives push toward dues, which in turn push toward a
government preference to provide "things" and which ultimately reduce the
revenue available for "people."
B. Inequality in Service Provision
Because they are explicitly based on the "get what you pay for" premise
that citizens should contribute to the cost of government's business in
direct proportion to the benefit they derive from those activities, dues
implicitly accept inequality in municipal services.30 2 To the extent that any
infrastructure, service, or regulatory program is financed through a dues

299. The mayor of Chicago has described police and fire as the "sacred cows" of the city's
budget, noting that the two services combined consume 65% of the city's'general revenues. Gary
Washburn, Daley Gives Self an Out in No-New-Tax Budget, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2002, at 1.
Professor Lee Anne Fennell has recently argued that police and fire services are not really classic
public goods because of the importance of the user pool in determining their quality. Lee Anne
Fennell, Beyond Exit and Voice: User Participationin the Productionof Local Public Goods, 80
TEx. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (2001). The term is.used here in its non-technical sense.
300. See FOSTER, supra note 20, at 222-24 (noting that areas with greater reliance on targeted
financing devices spend less on social welfare functions). I recently described this phenomenon in
an analysis of the role of intergovernmental cooperative efforts in metropolitan areas. See Reynolds,
supra note 2, at 144-45.
301. See FOSTER, supra note 20, at 190. Foster points out, however, that higher cost does not
necessarily indicate less efficiency; that is, regional special districts may provide a higher level and
quality of service than the general purpose government service provider. Id. at 184.
302. This assertion somewhat overstates the case. Local governments are free to offset the
regressive impact of any particular dues technique, either by a direct subsidy to the low income user
or by adopting some sort of income-based, sliding scale.
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technique, the government must either tolerate the inescapable fact that
low income users may have to forego the benefit or, in the alternative,
guarantee some sort of government subsidy. Dues, then, are more
regressive than taxes and lead to a greater concentration of wealth."' Tax
financing, in contrast, "promotes communal responsibility for important
social services and likely narrows service disparities. " "'
Though all dues techniques contribute to a drift toward inequality,
BIDs3 °5 are perhaps the most extreme example. Like other dues, they
condition receipt of a government benefit on ability to pay. Unlike other
dues techniques, however, they are explicitly marketed as a cost effective
way for a neighborhood or other sub-local unit to obtain supplemental. 6
services that the general purpose government is either unable or unwilling
to provide. Thus, BIDs offer a higher level of service for those segments
of the community that can pay for it. By creating an alternative to
government revenue redistribution for the general welfare, BIDs provide
a cheaper way for a narrow segment of the community to enhance itself
without contributing to similar improvements for others. This removes an
important incentive for the government to raise the general level of
municipal services: If those who can pay for a better level of services are
content, the pressure to enhance service across the municipality is greatly
reduced. Currently, BIDs occupy a very small percentage of local
budgets307 and are generally limited to urban business districts 0" where
they have been praised as an important tool for downtown revitalization.3 9
303. See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficultiesin Achieving CoherentState andLocalFiscal
Policy at the Intersectionof DirectDemocracy andRepublicanism: The Property Tax as a Case
in Point,35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 511, 568 (2002); see also Ray Boshara, Poverty is More than
a Matter of Income, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2002, § 4, at 13. Between 1993 and 1998, asset poverty
rose 14%. Id. Currently, the top 20% of the population earns 56% of the income and holds 83% of
the wealth. Id.; see also COHEN, supranote 13, at 395-96 (noting that between 1980 and 2000, the
income of the nation's top 5% of families increased from 14.6% to 20.8% of the total national
income); ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 45 (1999) (noting that earnings of the bottom 20%
have declined by more than 10% since 1979).
304. See FOsTER, supra note 20, at 107.
305. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
306. BID services are usually described as supplemental. Briffault, supra note 142, at 376
("BID services supplement city-provided services, while non-BID neighborhoods continue to
receive preexisting levels ofservices."). However, some argue that they may ultimately replace cityfunded services. See id. at 399-400.
307. In New York, the city with the largest BID program in the country, BIDs consume less
than two-tenths of one percent of the city's budget. See Briffault, supra note 142, at 464 ("In fiscal
1997, BID assessments in New York... come to less than $50 million... of the city's $34 billion
budget.").
308. See id. at 466-67. The BID phenomenon has been tried in the residential setting. See State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. City of Lakewood, 788 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); see also
Briffault, supra note 142, at 467-48.
309. See Briffault, supra note 142, at 399.
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Nevertheless, even BID proponents recognize the troubling implications
raised by local government adoption of techniques that explicitly
limit
310
access to municipal services on the basis of ability to pay.
Though BIDs may be the primary example of how dues push toward
inequality in municipal service provision, all dues techniques have that
potential. Consider, for example, the special assessment.3 ' On one level,
using a special assessment to fund neighborhood-specific improvements
like sidewalks, lighting, and street paving may reflect the consensus that
spending general tax revenues for these neighborhood improvements
would unfairly provide a special benefit to a small segment of the
community. What happens, though, to the neighborhoods where property
values are low and special assessments are not a practical alternative? One
of two results is possible. First, the government may choose to use other
revenues, including general tax revenues or funds from another
governmental source-like state or federal aid-to fund those
improvements. This practice segments the community into the "haves" and
the "have nots," creating a two-track system whereby affluent local
residents "pay twice": once directly for their own improvement and then
again through general tax levies for those who cannot pay. The second
possible result is that the government may simply accept the disparity in
services, leaving the residents of poorer areas without the services that
other neighborhoods pay for.3 2 The constitutionality of that practice may
be a closed issue under current Supreme Court doctrine; 31 3 nevertheless,
3 10. See id. at 462-69.
311. See discussion supra Part II.D. 1.
312. In fact, providing services and infrastructure by dues techniques appears to have allowed
municipal governments to avoid liability for racially disparate impacts caused by the inequality of
local services. In Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967, 970 (M.D. Ala. 1970), the
plaintiffs challenged the local government's practice of providing street paving only when property
owners indicated a willingness to pay an assessment to cover the cost. As a result, 97% of white
residents, but only 65% of black residents, lived on paved streets. Id. Though the discrimination
inherent in the use of the special assessment and other dues techniques may be beyond the reach
of federal constitutional protection, the discriminatory use of those techniques will be enjoined. See,
e.g., Ammons v. Dade City, Florida 783 F.2d 982, 983 (11th Cir. 1986) (invalidating special
assessments upon finding that city had imposed different requirements on residents of
predominantly black areas).
313. Arguments about a legally enforceable right to equal municipal services have generally
disappeared from the state and federal courts. See CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE
WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADmON

OF FARNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 53 (1986). Although prevailing standards
resulted in findings of unconstitutionality for provisions of municipal services on the basis of
municipal negligence or inaction combined with discriminatory effects, subsequent Supreme Court
rulings made clear that equal protection challenges require a showing of discriminatory intent. See
Clayton P. Gillette, Equality and Variety in the Delivery ofMunicipalServices, 100 HARV. L. REV.
946, 950 (1987) (reviewing HAAR & FESSLER, supra). Furthermore, the Court excluded wealthbased discrimination from the list of suspect classifications for the purpose of equal protection
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municipalities themselves might be troubled by the relentless push towards
that special assessments and other dues techniques
service 3inequality
14
provide.
C. New Urban Legends
1. The Myth of Precision
To withstand judicial scrutiny, dues must be based on a careful
calculation of the impact imposed by the payer and the benefit the payer
will derive. For all of the techniques discussed in earlier Parts, judicially
created tests force the government to correlate the charge imposed with the
benefit received by the payer; in the absence of a substantial connection or
correlation, the charge will be invalidated. The air of precision surrounding
the calculation, however, is likely to be illusory. First, it ignores the
multitude of reasons why new services or infrastructure are required. This
point can be made most strongly in the context of impact fees and
exactions, where numerous economic studies have tried to determine
whether the calculation of the fee properly assesses the benefit received or
burden imposed by the new development.3"5 Although economists do not
agree on who bears the ultimate cost of the fee or exaction,3"6 it appears
clear that many fee computations improperly ignore the fact that the service
or infrastructure needs are not entirely caused by new development.3" 7

analysis, making successful equal services challenges more unlikely. See id. The heavy burden of
proof in equal services cases now requires that the plaintiff prove not only the existence of racially
identifiable neighborhoods with a substantial inferiority in quality or quantity of services and
facilities, but also prove a discriminatory intent or motive. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450
F. Supp. 1363, 1379 (M.D. Fla. 1978). See generally VALENTE ET AL., supra note 88, at 730-5 1,
for a discussion of equality in the context of municipal services.
314. In the current metropolitan governance structure, moreover, BIDs may contribute to the
gap between favored quarter and central city. That is, because dues techniques are by definition
available only to those segments of the community with ability to pay, they disproportionately favor
affluent suburbia. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 270, at 105-06.
315. See generally Clarke & Evans, supranote 258.
316. See id. at 281-88 (finding that developers may plan for lower levels of capital investment
in cities that use impact fees); Yinger, supra note 258, at 23-41 (concluding that up to one-quarter
of the burden of development fees and special assessments fall on the owners of undeveloped land,
that fees confer a small capital gain on existing homeowners, and that developers in competitive
markets bear none of the cost of impact fees).
317. The findings of some studies suggest that cities give little consideration to accurate
measurement and fair allocation of infrastructure costs in determining the level of impact fees to
charge developers. A 1999 survey of eighty-five cities indicated that in nearly every case, city
officials could only guess at the percentage of costs that fees for various types of infrastructure were
designed to cover. See Clarke & Evans, supra note 258, at 285. A 1990 study found that the
percentage of infrastructure costs recovered by fees ranges widely from 2% in Texas to 60% in
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Changes in demographics, higher state and federal standards for the
construction of infrastructure, and changes in behavior on the part of
existing residents are also likely to contribute to the demand.318 For
instance, a need for new arterial roads in a community is probably
attributable not only to the demand placed on transportation routes by those
who live in new developments, but also to the fact that Americans continue
to drive more and more for trips of ever shorter distances.319
A recent case illustrates the phenomenon well. In PinellasCounty v.
State,32° the Florida Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a county fee for
a new "reclaimed water service component" in its water service system.
The new process was designed to make some re-treated wastewater
available for non-potable purposes like irrigation.32 ' Upholding the
county's decision to charge only the properties that would have access to
the new reclaimed water service, the court concluded that the special
benefit standard had been met because the users, unlike other county
residents, would have access to the reclaimed water.322 Although the fee's
computation may have satisfied the requirement that the fee-payer receive
a special benefit from the service, the underlying premise of the
computation is questionable. It may be the case that the need for the
additional water was created by new development in the county. What is
not apparent, however, is why the rest of the community, whose water
usage created the shortage in the first place, ought to be exempt from
paying for the new, more expensive treatment option. Nevertheless, the
conclusion of the court and the county that the fee properly imposed the
cost on the party creating the need for the water,3 23 represents an
unexceptional application of the state courts' special benefit tests.
Second, the aura of precision is derived from an artificially narrow view
of the relationship between cost and benefit. What appears to be a precise
calculation actually isolates the one moment in time the charge is assessed,
ignoring the mix of financing that went before and the allocation and
mixing of revenues that will come after. For instance, imposing on growth
the cost of a new sewage treatment plant in 2002 seems less precisely
calculated when placed in the very likely context that the existing twentyyear-old plant used by the established part of the community was funded
largely by federal grants. The calculation becomes even less precise when

California. Id. (citing J.L. LEITH & M. MONTAVON, IMPACT FEE PROGRAMS: A SURVEY OF DESIGN
AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES (1990)).
318. See ALTsHULER & GOMEZ-IBAlR1EZ, supra note 23, at 63-65.

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See id.
776 So. 2d 262, 263 (Fla. 2001).
Id. at264.
Id. at 267-68.
Id.
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subsequent financial contributions are factored in. Once the new
development is complete and on line, having paid for the new treatment
plant, the new development will pay user fees just like the other properties
in the jurisdiction. Because user fees typically are used to fund ongoing
maintenance and because the newly constructed treatment plant is unlikely
to need much in the way of maintenance for the immediate short term, the
user fee revenues are used disproportionately to benefit the existing
properties.324
Finally, the dues computation may ignore the more general benefit that
the infrastructure will have for non-users. For instance, government
funding of public transportation provides cleaner air for users and nonusers alike. In addition, riders on public transit reduce road congestion for
those who rely on automobiles. The vagueness and generality of the nonuser benefit may make the calculation impossible, but its indisputable
presence emphasizes that over-reliance on dues to finance many public
services unfairly penalizes the users and ignores benefits that flow to the
non-user and to the community as a whole.325
The validity of dues crucially depends on the premise that the
government will charge the dues-payer an amount that corresponds to the
benefit received or burden imposed. Judicial tests articulate that standard,
yet the precision it appears to rest on is subject to serious question. The
complexity of both the causes of the new demands and the overall
financing pattern is simply too great to disentangle in a way that makes the
computation of charge precise. While the dues calculation may meet the
government's goal of shifting costs away from tax funds, it is fanciful to
view the result as an accurate allocation of cost in exchange for benefit
received.
2. The Myth of Self Sufficiency326
The prevalence of user fees, assessments, and other dues techniques
may contribute to another myth: dues obscure the reality that most of the
capital-intensive services provided by local governments require large upfront infusions of revenue, most typically covered by tax revenues or grants

324. This situation is based on a recent sewer expansion project proposed for the UrbanaChampaign Sanitary District. See STEVEN C. CARTER, REPORT TO CITY COUNCIL: URBANA AND
CHAMPAIGN SANiTARY DISTRICT LONG RANGE PLAN IsSUES (200 1).
325. For one case in which a court recognized the importance of these generalized non-user
benefits, see New York Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1039 (2d Cir. 1995).
326. I made this observation initially in connection with my analysis of special districts in
metropolitan areas. See Reynolds, supranote 2, at 146. However, it is applicable to all types of dues
techniques, where expensive infrastructure is often funded by tax revenues, with the user fees going
to cover operating costs.
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from other levels of government.327 Though the dues-payer may have the
sense that she is paying her own way for the services she consumes,
because of the multiplicity of user fees and service charges that are levied
for many government services, the reality is likely to be more complex.
Oftentimes, the dues-payer's ability to enjoy the government service
depends on substantial initial expenditures of government revenues to pay
the capital costs of the "things" that the government needs to construct
before it can provide the services. The fees or other dues techniques are
likely to cover no more than the ongoing operating costs, while tax
revenues fund the expensive infrastructure needed to provide the service.32 s
The increasing use of dues to fund services may mask that reality and
foster the citizen's belief that the dues she pays cover the cost of the
services she consumes.
D. IncreasedAnti-Tax Sentiment
The strength of anti-tax sentiment is evident nationwide, articulated
over the past several decades in the form of numerous strict limitations
imposed by the voters on the government's ability to tax.32 9 Though the
entrenchment of this anti-tax mentality has a wide range of societal
explanations,33 the two dues myths undoubtedly reinforce and contribute

327. See FOSTER, supranote 20, at 14.
328. Moreover, depending on the service involved, the urban core may subsidize the provision
of infrastructure to the affluent suburban areas that ring it. One study of the Minneapolis
metropolitan area, for instance, concluded that the central urban areas paid more than $6 million
more in sewer fees than the costs they create. ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 71. Further, households in
the growing suburban areas received subsidies from those central city users ranging from between
$10 and $136 per household per year. Id Another study concluded that corporate relocation from
city to suburb creates a subsidy for low- and moderate-income minority city residents of the
suburban redevelopment. Joseph Persky & Wim Wiewel, The Distributionof Costs and Benefits
Due to Employment Deconcentration, in URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES 50, 67-69
(Rosalind Greenstein & Wim Wiewel eds., 2000); see generally Cashin, supra note 5, at 2004-15.
Similar claims can be made on the funding of regional transportation services. See Kevin L.
Siegel, Discriminationin the Funding of Mass TransitSystems, 4 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L
& POL'Y 107, 107 (1997); Richard Voith, The Determinants of Metropolitan Development
Patterns: What are the Roles of Preferences, Pricesand Public Policies?, in URBAN-SUBURBAN
INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra, at 71-82.
329. See Robinson, supra note 303, at 533-42; Stark, supra note 78, at 197-203. One author
described how, within two years of Proposition 13, forty-three states had adopted some form of
property tax relief or limitation on government powers of taxation. Steven Hayward, The Tax Revolt
Turns 20, POL'Y REV., July-Aug. 1998, at 9, 9.
330. One author posits two possible normative bases for anti-tax voter initiatives. See Stark,
supra note 78, at 207-16. First, they may rest on the underlying premise of the consent of the
governed. Id. at 207-10. In the alternative, they may reflect a libertarian anti-government attitude
that views taxation as illegitimate government coercion. Id. at 211-16. Another author traces the
rise of anti-tax sentiment to local abuse of the property tax. See Robinson, supra note 303, at 521-
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to the phenomenon. The myth ofprecision has a direct impact on the ways
citizens view taxes. As growing numbers of non-tax charges are assessed
" ' the payer becomes
for increasing numbers of government services,33
accustomed to receiving a benefit in exchange for paying her dues. Thus,
with targeted charges for many services and segregated revenue streams
that track payment to the assessed project, separating numerous revenue
items from the total bundle of overall expenses and projects, there is no
longer the sense that.the local budget has something for everybody. Once
the payer loses sight of the important role of local government in providing
a mix of services, regulations, and infrastructure appropriate to its
constituency, the search for a quid pro quo may become the dominant
analysis used by citizens to determine their support of government
expenditures.
Similarly, the myth of self sufficiency may contribute to a hardening
anti-tax resolve. As the taxpayer comes to sense that she pays for all
services directly through fees, assessments, or other dues techniques, she
may lose sight of the importance of general tax revenues that support the
services. As a result she may be less likely to support general taxes,
because she will conclude that she receives no benefit from those forced
contributions. Resistance to taxation may grow because taxes are perceived
as a vehicle that only redistributes wealth to the poor, while users pay their
own way for all other services.332
In addition, the increasing use of dues triggers an unending, counterproductive cycle: the more the voters disapprove of taxes, the more the
government turns to dues, 333 which in turn produces more anti-government
cynicism. By moving towards ever broader definitions of special benefits,
solely for the purpose of attaching charges to government services, the
government tests the outer limits of taxpayer credulity. 334 In addition,
citizen ire increases as the government appears to be orchestrating an endrun around tax limitations. 335 Unfortunately, the anti-tax sentiment does not

27.
331. See, e.g., Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45,4748 (N.C. 1994).
332. I recently described that sentiment in the following terms: "If the regional services that
Iuse are funded by fees, the reasoning goes, why should I support redistribution of my tax dollars
to fund regional social services, all of which will be funded by tax revenues rather than by user
fees?" Reynolds, supria note 2, at 146.
333. See Washburn, supra note 299, at 1.The author noted how Mayor Daley, while pledging
no new taxes, proposed numerous increases in fees and charges, including parking fines, valet
permits, driveway permits, billboard permits, fees for online payment of utility bills, and an increase
in the local water and sewer fee. Id.
334. As the court noted in Ventura Group Ventures, Inc. v. VenturaPortDistrict, 16 P.3 d 717,
727 (Cal. 2001), "If everything is special, nothing is special."
335. See Harris v. Wilson, 693 So. 2d 945, 950 (Fla. 1997) (Wells, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tjhe
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produce a proportional reduction in voter expectation for government
services. Citizens continue to want high quality services; they just don't
want to pay for them.336
Evidence of the ways this dues mentality has been translated into antitax sentiment was brought home to me most recently in a local bond
election to fund the renovation and expansion of the Champaign County
Nursing Home.337 Many of the project's passionate supporters urged voter
approval by appealing to our dues mentality. They argued that citizens
should vote for the bond because some day the voter or someone dear to
the voter will need the facility; they encouraged the "what's in it for me"
mentality that has been reinforced by decades of dues. Largely missing
from the discussion was a debate about whether the community, as an
amalgam of many different individuals of different ages and with different
health needs, has a responsibility to care for the elderly who need it,
irrespective of whether any individual voter ever sets foot inside the doors
of the nursing home. Thus, the local debate is no longer about the totality
of the package-the nursing home for you, the community college for
me-but rather an item-by-item dissection of cost and benefit to determine
whether a majority of the community concludes that each service it is being
asked to fund would further its own self interest. The redistributive
function of taxes seems to have taken a back seat to the consumer attitude
that seeks a benefit in every government expense."' Though this
phenomenon undoubtedly has a variety of sources and causes, the rapid
increase in the use of dues techniques contributes to the sentiment by
conditioning citizens to examine the relationship between cost and benefit
on which every dues technique is premised.

majority's decision now allows governments to give these voter mandates a wink and a nod and
then circumvents them by semantics in labeling as a special assessment what actually is a tax."); see
also Stark, supra note 78, at 199 (noting how local governments have "relied on creative legal
interpretations and innovative financial engineering in order to raise revenue without (arguably)
running afoul of the constitutional restrictions").
336. See Robinson, supra note 303, at 537 n.127 (describing studies documenting taxpayer
belief that reduced government revenue would not have a negative impact on services); see also
John H. Bowman et al., MobilizingResourcesforPublicServices: FinancingUrbanGovernments,
14 J. URB. AFF. 311 (1992) (describing how taxpayers want constant or enhanced levels of
government services, but voice consistent opposition to higher taxes). Recent voter initiatives in
two states support these assertions. In Florida, voters approved an initiative to reduce class sizes,
while California voters adopted a $400 million program for after-school care. Christopher Marquis,
The 2002 Elections:Ballot Initiatives;School andAnimal Welfare Measures Prove Popular,but
Health Care Falters,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2002, at B3. Neither measure contained any funding
mechanism. Id.
337. See Mike Monson, Voters to Decide on Tax Hikes, NEWS- GAZE=TE (Champaign, Ill.),
July 31, 2002, at Al; Mike Monson, Nursing Home Estimates Shocking, NEWS-GAZETTE,
(Champaign, Ill.), May 21, 2002, at Al.
338. See COHEN, supra note 13, at 343-44.
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CONCLUSION: DUES, FAIRNESS, AND REGIONALISM

In the debate over the impacts of dues, at least three assertions appear
to enjoy general acceptance. First, as compared to local taxation, dues are
more costly. They entail more administrative costs, more consulting costs,
and more accounting machinations to allocate and track the use of
segregated funds.339 Second, although urban economists disagree on the
important question of who ultimately bears the cost of dues, they appear to
agree that land developers generally do not.34° Some qualify the assertion
to suggest that, in times of rapid and expensive growth, developers may
have to absorb the costs of dues levied in the form of exactions.34 ' In other
circumstances, however, either the ultimate homeowner or perhaps the
owner of undeveloped land is most likely to shoulder the cost of dues.342
Third, and finally, dues are regressive-and certainly more regressive than
local taxation.343 They penalize the young and the poor at the expense of
the established, older segments of the community.3"
Though these accepted facts may provide reasons to question the
wisdom of dues, alone they cannot answer the question whether dues are
fair. Resolution of that debate, of course, requires a definition of fairness
in the provision of local government services. That task extends well
beyond the scope of this Article.345 For instance, if fairness is based on the

339. Professor Foster compared services provided by general purpose local governments with
those provided by single purpose special districts and concluded that the latter are more expensive.
See FOSTER, supranote 20, at 148-88. Although her study did not compare the cost impacts of dues
financing versus general taxation, most ofthe explanations for higher costs in special district service
provision apply to segregated dues financing techniques as well.
340. See FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 67; Yinger, supra note 258, at 37 (concluding that, when
the local housing market is competitive, developers do not bear the costs of development impact
fees).
341. See ALTSHULER& GOMEz-IBAREz, supra note 23, at 98-104.
342. See id.at 98-100; see also Yinger, supranote 258, at 41 ("The buyers of new homes will
indeed bear some of the burden of these fees as the benefits of infrastructure show up in the prices
they pay for housing.... [However, one-quarter or more of the burden of these fees could fall on
the owners of undeveloped land.").
343. The property tax itself is subject to substantial criticism. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG ET
AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

656 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that the poor pay a higher percentage of

income on housing than the wealthy); Robinson, supra note 303, at 535-36 (noting that targeted
relief may offset the regressivity of the property tax). Notwithstanding the ongoing debate over the
local property tax's regressivity, fees, user charges, and other dues techniques are even more
regressive. See id. at 533, 538.
344. See ALTSHULER & GOMEz-IBAN'EZ, supra note 23, at 106-09.
345. H. Peyton Young describes three general theories, each of which could be used to
evaluate the dues versus taxes conundrum in local government law. H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY:
INTHEORY AND PRACTICE 9-10 (1994). Consider the following short definitions of fairness:
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premise that an individual's receipt of benefits should be commensurate
with her contribution, dues techniques may best reflect that underlying
premise. If, in contrast, fairness means that society has some basic
obligation to enhance the welfare of all of its citizens, dues, especially if
used in large doses, are unlikely to promote that goal. In current
regionalism scholarship, however, concerns over a definition of fairness
have taken a back seat to an emerging, overriding consensus that local
government law must be restructured to reduce the widening gap in
metropolitan areas between the affluent suburban quarter and the rest ofthe
metropolitan area: the academic debate now revolves around how, and not
whether, redistribution of wealth could best eliminate that gap.346 Although
fairness concerns clearly motivate some proposals, others embrace
regionalism for quite different reasons. As a result, in the current proregionalist climate, the fairness of dues would appear to be less important
than their impact on regionalism proposals.
Review of the literature suggests at least four distinct normative
underpinnings for the current regionalism proposals: efficiency,
economic
interdependency, democratic participation, and equity.3 47 First, some assert
that the current allocation of local government power in metropolitan
governance, with its plethora of fragmented government units, creates
inefficiencies by allowing local governments to impose costs on others and
by allowing suburbs to maximize their own wealth at the expense of the
central city they surround.348 Moreover, in metropolitan areas especially,
There are three general theories ofjustice that figure prominently in discussions
about equity. The oldest and most prominent is Aristotle's equityprinciple, which
states that goods should be divided in proportion to each claimant's
contributions....
A second theory ofjustice is classical utilitarianism, which asserts that goods
should be distributed so as to maximize the total welfare of the claimants (the
greatest goodfor the greatest number)....
A third approach to social justice.., is due to John Rawls .... [His] central
distributive principle may be simply stated: the least well-off group in society
should be made as well off as possible.
Id. Each of those standards could apply to an evaluation of dues techniques.
346. See Reynolds, supra note 2, at 111-19.
347. See VALENTE ETAL., supra note 88, at 350-52; Richard Briffault, supranote 297, at 1526; Cashin, supra note 5, at 2042-47.
348. See, e.g., Briffault, supranote 297, at 18-20; Cashin, supra note 5, at 2000-01. Empirical
studies that have reached that conclusion include: Persky & Wiewel, supra note 328, at 69
(concluding that expansion of suburban manufacturing employment opportunities imposes
substantial costs on inner city residents and represents a "subsidy from low- and moderate-income,
black and Hispanic residents of the city and inner suburbs to stockholders elsewhere in the nation");
and Voith, supranote 328, at 78-80 (concluding in a study of government spending on Philadelphia
transit that cities subsidize suburban transit development, leading to inefficient suburbanization and
diminished opportunities for central city and a clear causal link between city and suburban
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443

a large territorial base might better distribute the costs of infrastructure and
produce a higher quality, if not less expensive, service.34 9 Those who favor
efficiency arguments, then, propose reforms that would reduce
metropolitan disparity by achieving higher levels of efficiency in the
distribution of services.
The second, closely related argument in support of regionalism is based
on the asserted economic interdependence of the metropolitan region. This
approach relies on recent evidence that suburban economic well-being
suffers as the gap between suburb and city widens. The suggested
' transforms central city health into an item
"interdependence imperative"35
of intense suburban self interest and argues that suburbia ignores the fate
of the city to the detriment of its own prosperity. Stated simply, the claim
is that healthier metropolitan regions contain more prosperous central
cities. In fact, in the twenty-five metropolitan areas with the most rapid
income growth, central city incomes also increased.35 '

dependency).
349. Professor Foster concluded that services provided by regional single purpose government
units are actually more expensive than when those same services are provided by the general
purpose local government unit. See FOSTER, supra note 20, at 148-88. Foster speculates that the
higher cost is due to "inflationary influence of political isolation, functional specialization, and
administrative and financial flexibility ..." Id. at 174-76. She recognizes, however, that regional
special district service provision may be more expensive because it is of a higher quality. See id.
at 184. In addition to evidence about the high cost of services provided by regional special districts,
some question this approach to regionalism because of its clearly limited scope. As Henry Cisneros
has argued, regionalism by special district results in "things-regionalism," notably large
infrastructure-intensive services, while completely neglecting "people-regionalism," which would
entail attention to regional problems like housing, employment, and social services. See CISNEROS,
supra note 297, at 8-9.
350. NEAL R. PEIRCE, CrrsTATEs: How URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPEITIIVE
WORLD 131-32 (1993). In Peirce's view, suburban prosperity requires a strong central city for six
main reasons: (1) central city image is crucial to regional welfare; (2) new regional employers will
rely on city markets to hire their work force; (3) failure to address inner-city social problems will
come back to haunt all taxpayers in the form of higher costs for prisons and welfare; (4) inner-city
crime affects the image of the entire region; (5) environmental issues can only be addressed regionwide; and (6) regional cooperation will bring enhanced political clout. Id. Anthony Downs
identified similarly vital functions served by cities in metropolitan areas. See ANTHONY DOWNS,
NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 52-59 (1994).
351. See LARRY C. LEDEBUR ETAL., NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, "ALL IN ITTOGETHER": CmIES,
SUBURBS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGIONS (1993). Conversely, in the eighteen metropolitan areas
that recently experienced income decline, central city income declined in all but four instances. Id.
The report implied that metropolitan area suburbs have a stake in the economic well-being of their
central cities. See id. Other analysts reached similar conclusions about the interdependence of
suburb and city. See, e.g., H.V. Savitch et al., Ties thatBind: CentralCities, Suburbs, andthe New
MetropolitanRegion, 7 ECON. DEV. Q. 341 (1993); Richard Voith, CentralCity Decline: Regional
orNeighborhoodSolutions,BUS. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 3-16; Richard Voith, City andSuburban
Growth: Substitutes or Complements?, BUS. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21-33.
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A third strand of regionalism scholarship focuses less on the economics
of metropolitan areas and argues that ideals of democratic participation
militate strongly in favor of metropolitan area government reform. The fact
that many local governments take actions whose impacts extend far beyond
their borders underscores the fundamentally anti-democratic lack of
confluence between local governments' physical territory and the scope of
their powers in U.S. metropolitan regions.35 In that view, a regionally
bounded multi-purpose government would better promote those
longstanding democratic ideals.
Finally, fairness enters regionalist scholarship in local government law
to make the normative claim that the current economic schism between city
and suburb is morally unacceptable. The argument starts with the
recognition that suburbanization and the central city decline that
accompanied it was not a spontaneous, fortuitous occurrence, but rather the
result of deliberate government policies that transferred large amounts of
public resources from city to suburb.3 53 More broadly, though, the
argument rests on the conviction that regional redistribution of wealth is
' Thus, although some definitions of fairness might
"the right thing to do."354
argue that dues are defensible and, indeed, preferable, the current
regionalist debate appears united in its strong support of regional
redistribution; raising revenue by dues runs fundamentally counter to that
goal.
352. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 1164-70; Cashin, supra note 5, at 2035-47.
353. Metropolitan highway systems, government funding ofcommuter rail systems, education
spending, government mortgage financing, and the privileged tax status of real property tax
payments represent huge public subsidies of the suburbs at the expense of the cities. See, ANDRES
DuANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN

DREAM 8-15 (2000); ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 71 (finding that Minneapolis and St. Paul, in

allocating the costs of regional sewage disposal, pay $6 million more in fees than they incur in
costs); Cashin, supra note 5, at 2003-14 (citing various examples where the "'favored quarter"'
receives a disproportionate share of public infrastructure funds for roads, highways, and expensive
sanitary sewage treatment systems); Voith, supranote 328, at 78-80 (claiming that in Philadelphia,
and possibly other cities, the central city subsidized public transit for suburbanites).
354. In the words of one urban economist who recently concluded that the regionalists'
economic interdependency argument is at best subject to empirical dispute:
Why is it that programs to help our neighbors pull themselves out of poverty must
be justified in terms of the economic self-interest of those who provide the cash?
We worry that by contributing to this literature, we have changed the terms of the
debate to a positivist realm in which, if the numbers don't come out right,
metropolitan antipoverty programs will have been proven to be a "bad idea." But
a number of us believe that antipoverty programs are always a good idea, simply
because they are the right thing to do.
Paul D. Gottlieb, The Effects of Poverty on MetropolitanArea Economic Performance:A PolicyOrientedResearch Review, in URBAN-SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES, supra note 328, at 43.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss2/2

72

Reynolds: Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What you Pay For" Mo
TAXMS, FEES, ASSEESM.EM, DUES

Although the increasing importance of dues in municipal finance has
negative implications for many aspects of local and regional governance,
a realistic assessment leads to the conclusion that there is no easy way to
change the status quo. Firmly entrenched factors at all levels of the
government structure exert a large pro-dues force such that reversal of the
trend appears extremely unlikely. State constitutions and laws, the state
and federal judiciaries, numerous internal and external financial incentives,
and firmly held beliefs about growth all play an important role in the
preservation and further solidification of the dues approach to local
government finance.
Moreover, as the longstanding history of many local government
financing practices indicates, dues may, in fact, play an important, positive
role in a community's overall allocation of services. When the choice of
dues results from a reasoned decision about the financing of a particular
government project or service as but one part ofthe overall totality of local
financing mechanisms, it is likely to reflect a consensus about the
importance of the service, the general ability to pay on the part of the
targeted beneficiaries, and the other mix of considerations articulated
earlier in this Article.355 It is only when local governments are pushed to
adopt them as an all purpose revenue raising device that dues exert an
undue anti-regionalist influence. In those cases, they tend toward inequality
and contribute to an intensified consumer vision of local government. This
Article has argued that this shift has already occurred and that it has
profound and negative implications for regionalism that previously have
been overlooked.
Local government scholars of many doctrinal camps have come
together to recognize the pressing need for regional answers to
metropolitan problems. The range of solutions they propose is broad and
reflects a wide range of underlying ideologies. For all of the current
proposals, however, the proliferation ofdues is a serious impediment. Dues
provide a way for privileged segments of the community, or of the region,
to preserve the very gap that regionalism seeks to reduce. Quite simply, if
local government dues techniques are left untouched by the regionalists'
reforms, the current inter-municipal inequality will merely be transformed
into intra-regional inequality.

355. See discussion supra Parts II.C.1-6.
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